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RELATIONSHIPS AND RETALIATION IN THE #METOO ERA 
Nicole Buonocore Porter* 
Abstract 
 In this #MeToo era, so much important work is being done (and so 
many stories are being told and listened to), but very little of the work 
focuses on retaliation. And none of the work focuses on situations where 
the fear of retaliation is not necessarily job loss (although that certainly 
happens) but rather, it is the fear of harming workplace relationships. This 
Article will use a real-life story of harassment to demonstrate how much 
workplace relationships matter—especially to women—and how the fear 
of harming those relationships often affects an employee’s willingness to 
report harassment. Thus, this Article argues for reforms surrounding 
harassment and retaliation law that recognize this reality. Right now, 
courts penalize victims of harassment for not reporting harassment soon 
enough because they feared harming their workplace relationships; or, 
when they do report, courts penalize them by holding that the 
relationship-based harm they experienced after reporting was not a real 
harm worthy of a remedy. These courts reason that reasonable employees 
would not and should not be deterred from reporting harassment because 
they fear relationship-based harms. And yet, most of the empirical 
evidence shows that the opposite is true: reasonable employees 
(sometimes men, but especially women) often do avoid reporting because 
they fear harming their relationships in the workplace. The law should 
reflect this reality. 
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INTRODUCTION: NINA’S STORY 
This is a true story about a friend who experienced harassment and 
stayed silent. This friend (Nina) was also a lawyer. Nina was working as 
an in-house lawyer for a manufacturing company, handling the labor and 
employment work of the entire company. This company had about 
twenty-five plants across the country. Her “clients” were the human 
resources (HR) personnel at all of the plants and the headquarters, where 
Nina worked. She was new to this in-house job, and she knew that she 
needed to work hard at establishing good relationships with the clients; 
otherwise, when a problem arises at a plant, the HR manager would either 
forego getting legal advice at all or would use an outside lawyer, wasting 
company resources.  
Nina spent the first couple of months traveling to several plants, 
meeting as many HR managers as possible to get to know them, to talk 
about the plant’s employment issues, and to offer her services. On one of 
these visits she met a man (John), who was an HR regional manager in 
charge of HR for eight other plants (i.e., HR managers at those eight 
plants reported to John). Nina knew it was important to make a good 
impression. She met John over dinner and drinks with the plant’s HR 
manager and a couple of other managers from the plant. John was friendly 
to the point of being flirtatious, and as the night wore on, the flirtation 
seemed to cross the line into advances. Nina assumed John’s excessive 
drinking explained his behavior and she did not really let it bother her too 
much. She traveled back home the next morning and put it behind her.  
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Two months later, Nina traveled to another state where the company 
was having a weekend-long retreat for all of the HR managers in the 
company. This was going to be a great opportunity for Nina to meet the 
HR managers that she had not already met and to establish herself as an 
employment law expert and a team player.  
On the first night of the retreat, those who had already arrived (about 
ten people, including Nina) were having drinks outside on the patio of the 
hotel. John was one of those people and seemed to pick up right where 
he left off two months earlier. He was much more brazen this time. He 
kept leaning over to whisper in Nina’s ear the graphic sexual things he 
wanted to do to and with her. He also kept putting his hand on her knee 
or thigh. Nina tried to ignore him, but John was relentless. In addition to 
the graphic statements whispered in her ear and the touching, he kept 
trying to get her to walk down to the beach with him. Others at the table 
could tell something was not right. One of the female HR managers 
caught Nina’s eyes and quietly asked if she was okay. Nina assured her 
she was fine.  
Because what were her choices? She could tell John off, privately or 
loud enough for the others to hear. She could just get up and leave. Or 
she could do nothing. She chose to do nothing, other than to constantly 
move John’s hand off her knee and repeatedly tell him “no” in response 
to every one of his crude comments or suggestions. Nina chose to do 
nothing because the other choices possibly involved harming her 
relationships with these clients. She was embarrassed by his attention and 
did not want the other HR managers thinking that she had done something 
to bring it on or that she was overly sensitive or “uptight.” She already 
had a sense of the culture at this company. These people worked hard, 
played hard, and were very thick-skinned. Generally, Nina was too. She 
thought that raising a stink about John’s behavior would contradict the 
impression she wanted them to have of her.  
And, just as importantly, she was worried about offending John by 
calling him out on his boorish behavior. Because if she angered him, she 
knew there was a strong likelihood that he would not only stop using her 
legal services, but he would convince the HR managers that he supervised 
to stop calling her too. Nina knew that her relationships with these people 
were important.  
This is also why Nina did not tell the other lawyer when he arrived at 
the retreat or the director of HR, who was John’s boss. She also did not 
say anything to the general counsel (Nina’s boss) when she returned 
home after the retreat. She thought long and hard about saying something. 
Nina knew that John’s behavior was inappropriate and bordered on 
violating the law, and even though she knew she could handle the 
situation, she was nervous about seeing him again (especially if there 
were not plenty of other people around). Nina also knew that John could 
3
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be a liability risk for the company. Even though she had no intention of 
suing, if John was doing this to her, he was possibly (maybe likely?) 
doing it to others who might sue the company. Her job as an in-house 
lawyer was to minimize the company’s employment risks. And yet she 
still said nothing.  
Why? Because Nina imagined the reaction, especially of the HR 
director but possibly of the general counsel or the other lawyers in the 
department, and it was not good. Knowing the culture of this company, 
Nina was fairly certain that they would think that she was overreacting 
and being a whiny troublemaker, or they would think she was not cut out 
to work in a male-dominated manufacturing environment. Someone who 
rocked the boat like this was not someone they would respect. Nina was 
also worried about what everyone would be thinking or saying about her 
if (really, when) her complaint became public knowledge. Nina was 
raised as a people pleaser, and she believed one of her strongest assets 
was her ability to get along with others. The chance that several people 
would be mad at her for complaining, or the possibility of them talking 
about her behind her back, was unthinkable and anxiety producing. 
So she stayed quiet, even though she knew better. Two years later, 
when she had decided to leave for another job, she found out from the 
HR director that John had made advances at a company picnic towards 
the wife of one of the plant managers, and he was fired for it. At this 
point, Nina felt it was safe to tell the HR director what had happened to 
her two years earlier. He asked her why she had not said anything before, 
and she responded with a question: “What would you have thought about 
me if I had brought this complaint to your attention?” He just laughed and 
agreed she had made the right decision not to say anything at the time.  
So what is the point of this story? The point is that if you have not 
experienced harassment and feared retaliation, it is hard to understand 
why harassment victims do not come forward, even when the feared 
retaliation is not termination.  
This Article argues that workplace relationships matter (especially to 
women) and demonstrates how the fear of harming those relationships 
often affects an employee’s willingness to report harassment. Thus, this 
Article argues for two reforms surrounding harassment and retaliation 
law that recognize this reality.  
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the problem. 
Specifically, it argues that reporting levels of harassment are very low in 
large part because victims of harassment fear retaliation. This Part then 
introduces the legal rules for sexual harassment and retaliation. It also 
explains the catch-22 that the law surrounding these two doctrines 
creates: if harassment victims wait too long to report the harassment, they 
might lose their harassment claim, but if they complain too early and are 
retaliated against, they will likely lose their retaliation claim.  
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Part II then turns to the specific focus of this Article, which is 
relationship-based harm. It discusses social science literature and 
provides caselaw examples where the retaliation a plaintiff is claiming is 
some type of relationship-based harm, such as being ostracized in the 
workplace. It also explains how “cultural” (or “relational”) feminism 
helps to explain why women are much more likely than men to be worried 
about relationship-based harms.  
Finally, Part III provides a two-part proposal. First, the affirmative 
defense for harassment claims should be amended to allow plaintiffs to 
survive summary judgment when they delay reporting harassment 
because of fear of harming their workplace relationships. Second, the 
retaliation doctrine should be expanded to consider relationship-based 
harms as “adverse employment actions.”  
I.  EXPLAINING THE PROBLEM 
The #MeToo movement has told a narrative that is not quite true. This 
narrative is that women are reporting harassment at a much higher rate 
than ever before, and that they are doing so without penalty.1 That might 
be true for high-profile Hollywood types2 who shared their stories to have 
them heard3 and not to necessarily seek a remedy in the workplace.4 But 
reporting harassment against a current supervisor or coworker is fraught 
 
 1. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Essay, Ending Harassment by Starting with Retaliation, 
71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 49, 49 (2018), https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
sites/3/2018/06/71-Stan.-L.-Rev.-Online-Porter-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8Y6-7Y7E].  
 2. Cf. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Beyond #MeToo, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1146, 1173 (2019) 
(noting that women whose abusers are not famous would have a hard time getting the media to 
listen to their stories); Lesley Wexler et al., #MeToo, Time’s Up, and Theories of Justice, 2019 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 45, 53 (noting that public shaming might not help those who are not in positions of 
power or in the public eye). To be clear, even Harvey Weinstein’s victims of harassment avoided 
reporting for many years, in part because he threatened to destroy their reputations if they spoke 
out. Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV. 
229, 234 (2018). 
 3. See Jessica A. Clarke, The Rules of #MeToo, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 37, 41 (stating that 
the originators of the #MeToo movement saw it as a “‘therapeutic, restorative, and educational’ 
effort” (quoting Lesley Wexler, #MeToo and Law Talk, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 343, 345)); 
Tuerkheimer, supra note 2, at 1174 (noting the benefits of the #MeToo movement as catharsis, 
validation, and solidarity). 
 4. See Clarke, supra note 3, at 46–47 (“[I]ncapacitating and deterring high-level harassers 
only assists a privileged pool of potential victims, and only in a limited set of 
circumstances . . . . Survivors without fame and fortune are less likely to find investigative 
journalists eager to tell their stories.”); Porter, supra note 1, at 49, 51–52; Wexler et al., supra 
note 2, at 51 (noting that Alyssa Milano’s #MeToo movement was not intended to be a call for 
action and was more of an attempt to get the public to understand the prevalence of harassment 
and assault and to enhance the believability of victims); id. at 54 (stating that the naming and 
shaming campaign does not solve the issue of workplace protections for victims).  
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with risk and often brings little reward for one very simple reason—
retaliation.5  
A.  Fear of Retaliation Leads to Low Reporting Rates6 
For an employer to stop and remedy harassment, the victim of the 
harassment needs to report it.7 And yet, by all accounts, reports of 
harassment are very low.8 Despite the fact that in one study, four in ten 
 
 5. Porter, supra note 1, at 50; see also Tuerkheimer, supra note 2, at 1166 (stating that 
most victims of harassment often end up worse off after reporting and that it thus is actually 
unreasonable for them to report); Carly McCann & Donald T. Tomaskovic-Devey, Nearly All 
Sexual Harassment at Work Goes Unreported—and Those Who Do Report Often See Zero 
Benefit, CONVERSATION (Dec. 14, 2018), http://theconversation.com/nearly-all-sexual-
harassment-at-work-goes-unreported-and-those-who-do-report-often-see-zero-benefit-108378 
[https://perma.cc/BR9T-GXV3] (stating that the #MeToo and #TimesUp movements have 
brought renewed attention to workplace sexual harassment but the vast majority of allegations go 
unreported and those who do report tend to face troubling outcomes). In fact, as noted by Professor 
Brake, the fact that #MeToo has bolstered the credibility of women complaining about sexual 
harassment is not likely to reduce retaliation and might even make it worse because many people 
think that the #MeToo movement has gone too far. See Deborah L. Brake, Coworker Retaliation 
in the #MeToo Era, 49 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 2 (2019). 
 6. This Section is derived in part from Porter, supra note 1, at 51–52.  
 7. Obviously, some harassment is so open and notorious that the employer might be aware 
of it without a complaint by the victim. But generally speaking, victims need to report harassment 
before employers can remedy it. See Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Risk of Complaining—Retaliation, 
38 J.C. & U.L. 1, 36 (2011) (“Of course, if the victims of discrimination do not complain, 
discrimination is likely to continue unchecked.”); Joanna L. Grossman, Moving Forward, Looking 
Back: A Retrospective on Sexual Harassment Law, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1031 (2015) (stating 
that only when someone names, blames, and claims harassment will anything be done about it); 
Anne Lawton, The Bad Apple Theory in Sexual Harassment Law, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 817, 
846 (2005) (stating that many courts assume that the employer is powerless to stop harassment 
unless employees report it); cf. Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment from 
Employment Discrimination Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 39 (2018), 
https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/06/71-Stan.-L.-Rev.-Online-
Schultz-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/V972-XDDN] (“Discouraging victims from reporting not only 
robs them of relief . . . [but] also deprives employers . . . of the victims’ view of what harassment 
is.”).  
 8. U.S. EEOC, SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: 
REPORT OF CO-CHAIRS CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC 15 (2016); Anne Lawton, 
Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 197, 208 (2004) (stating that reporting harassment is a “very uncommon 
occurrence” (quoting Bonnie S. Dansky & Dean G. Kilpatrick, The Effects of Sexual Harassment, 
in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND TREATMENT 152, 158 (William O'Donohue 
ed., 1997))); Lawton, supra note 7, at 847 (describing the very low reporting rates of harassment); 
McCann & Tomaskovic-Devey, supra note 5 (stating that about “[five] million people experience 
sexual harassment at work every year, yet on average only around 9,200 file a charge with the 
EEOC or [the state equivalent],” which amounts to 99.8% of people who do not file a charge).  
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women stated they experienced harassment in the workplace,9 the number 
who reported this harassment is much, much lower.10 For instance, one 
study revealed that although 44% of those who experienced harassment 
at work took no action, only 12% reported the conduct.11 Another study 
revealed that large employers receive only six complaints per year, about 
.02% of employees.12 Instead, most victims ignore incidents of 
harassment or take costly steps to avoid the harasser or the job.13 In fact, 
of all of a victim’s responses, the most infrequent is to report.14 
The reason for this low rate of reporting is because victims of 
harassment fear all types of retaliatory actions,15 including, as described 
 
 9. Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over 
Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 5 (2003).  
 10. Id. at 23 (“Sexual harassment victims have traditionally tended not to utilize internal 
complaint procedures or otherwise formally report problems of harassment.”).  
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 24; see also Lawton, supra note 8, at 208 (citing several studies of very low reports 
of harassment: 2–6% in one study, 13.3% in the private sector and 6% in the university setting in 
another study, and other studies indicating a low of 5% and a high of 18%).  
 13. Kimberly M. Cummings & Madeline Armenta, Penalties for Peer Sexual Harassment 
in an Academic Context: The Influence of Harasser Gender, Participant Gender, Severity of 
Harassment, and the Presence of Bystanders, 47 SEX ROLES 273, 274 (2002) (stating that the most 
common responses to harassment are to ignore it or avoid it and that reporting it is the least 
common response); Grossman, supra note 9, at 25; see also U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at v (stating 
that harassment victims tend to avoid the harasser, deny the significance or seriousness of the 
harassment, ignore it, or endure it); Lilia M. Cortina et al., What’s Gender Got to Do with It? 
Incivility in the Federal Courts, 2002 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 235, 259 (stating that, in a study of 
mistreatment suffered by attorneys (much of it gender-related), most attorneys ignored, denied, 
or minimized the mistreatment).  
 14. Grossman, supra note 9, at 26; see U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at 15 (“[T]he extent of 
non-reporting is striking.”); Lawton, supra note 8, at 208 (discussing the underreporting problem); 
see also U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at 17 (“[I]n many work environments, the most ‘reasonable’ 
course of action for the victim to take is to avoid reporting the harassment.”); Shereen G. Bingham 
& Lisa L. Scherer, Factors Associated with Responses to Sexual Harassment and Satisfaction 
with Outcome, 29 SEX ROLES 239, 240–41, 247 (1993) (stating that employees seldom report 
harassment and that formal and informal complaints were the least likely used responses to 
harassment); Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn’t She Just Report Him? The Psychological and 
Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 117, 121 
(1995) (stating that the most infrequent response to harassment is to seek organizational relief). 
 15. U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at 16 (stating that many victims of harassment never report it 
because they anticipate social retaliation, including humiliation and ostracism); Grossman, supra 
note 9, at 51 & n.294 (citing Mary P. Rowe, People Who Feel Harassed Need a Complaint System 
with Both Formal and Informal Options, 6 NEGOT. J. 161, 164 (1990)) (referring to an estimate 
based on personal experience that indicated that 75% of victims express serious concerns about 
retaliation); see also Cortina et al., supra note 13, at 259–60 (stating that the primary reason 
lawyers participating in the study did not report mistreatment “was fear—of harming their clients’ 
cases, damaging their professional image, losing favor with the judge,” and work-related 
retaliation); Fitzgerald et al., supra note 14, at 122 (stating that many victims do not report because 
they fear retaliation, as well as fear not being believed and being humiliated); Anne Lawton, 
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more below, being ostracized by coworkers.16 Social science research 
“consistently has shown that women do not report (or delay reporting) 
harassment because they fear retaliation, they believe no one will believe 
them, or they think reporting will make the situation at work worse.”17 
This fear of retaliation in all forms is not unfounded.18 In fact, studies 
demonstrate that employees who report harassment often face adverse 
consequences, including termination.19 
But employers do not even need to retaliate to deter reports. 
Retaliation performs most of its work simply by being threatened 
(explicitly or implicitly).20 As Professor Deborah L. Brake notes, 
“[d]ecisions about whether to challenge discrimination rest on a careful 
balancing of the costs and benefits of doing so.”21 Women who choose 
not to report harassment do so because they believe that the costs of 
 
Between Scylla & Charybdis: The Perils of Reporting Sexual Harassment, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. 
L. 603, 604–05 (2007) (discussing how fear of retaliation stops victims from reporting). 
 16. L. Camille Hébert, Why Don’t “Reasonable Women” Complain About Sexual 
Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711, 731, 741 (2007) (describing employees’ fear of how their 
coworkers would treat them after reporting harassment); Lawton, supra note 15, at 621 
(discussing the fact that after the author reported harassment by one of her more senior colleagues, 
the silence inside the department was “deafening”); see also U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at 16 
(separating out professional retaliation that affects the job directly and “social retaliation,” such 
as being ostracized).  
 17. Lawton, supra note 15, at 618–19.  
 18. Lawton, supra note 8, at 258 (stating that the fear of retaliation is “not baseless”); see 
also Rebecca Walker, Mitigating the Fear of Retaliation: Helping Employees Feel Comfortable 
Reporting Suspected Misconduct, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, Mar.–Apr. 2008, at 19, 20 
(stating that one in eight employees experience some form of retaliation for reporting suspected 
misconduct).  
 19. Grossman, supra note 9, at 52; see Lawton, supra note 8, at 266. A 2003 study indicated 
that 75% of those who reported harassment experienced retaliation. U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at 
16. Although this is merely anecdotal evidence, the Author found it interesting that in the 
harassment stories that the EEOC discussed in the Task Force report, all of them involved the 
harassment victim being retaliated against. Id. at 3–5; see also Mindy E. Bergman et al., The 
(Un)reasonableness of Reporting: Antecedents and Consequences of Reporting Sexual 
Harassment, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 230, 237 (2002) (finding in their study that reporting triggers 
retaliation and causes victims harm); Bingham & Scherer, supra note 14, at 263 (stating that filing 
formal or informal complaints did not resolve the harassing situation); Fitzgerald et al., supra note 
14, at 122 (stating that 62% of workers who reported harassment experienced retaliation, 
including lower job evaluations, denial of promotions, and being transferred or fired); Hébert, 
supra note 16, at 740 (stating that women are not unreasonable for fearing negative consequences 
from reporting harassment because negative consequences often occur and those who complain 
often get evaluated more negatively); McCann & Tomaskovic-Devey, supra note 5 (stating that 
the low proportion of employees who file sexual harassment claims is likely a function of 
employers’ punitive responses where two-thirds of those employees will lose their jobs).  
 20. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 39 (2005). 
 21. Id. at 36.  
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reporting outweigh the benefits.22 As is discussed more below,23 the 
organizational culture of an employer greatly influences how much of a 
role retaliation plays in that organization.24  
B.  Harassment Claims 
To bring a successful harassment claim under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,25 the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that the 
harassment was because of a protected trait; (2) that the harassment was 
unwelcome; (3) that it was severe or pervasive so as to create an abusive 
work environment; and (4) some basis for establishing employer 
liability.26  
Before elaborating on the employer liability issue (which is often the 
hardest element for plaintiffs in harassment claims), this Article analyzes 
Nina’s potential harassment claim. Because Nina’s experience involved 
sexual comments and overtures, it certainly would be considered 
“because of sex.” Based on the facts, it seems obvious that Nina did not 
“welcome” the harassment, but some courts would use the fact that Nina 
did not explicitly tell John to stop as evidence that the harassment was 
not unwelcome.27 Assuming Nina could prove that the harassment was 
unwelcome, proving the severe or pervasive element is likely difficult for 
Nina. The first incident of harassment was strictly verbal. The second 
time John harassed Nina, there was some “touching,” but it was not the 
type of touching that would normally be considered “severe”—he had his 
hand on her knee or thigh but he did not grope her private parts.28 It is 
unlikely that even the two instances together would be considered 
pervasive.29 Thus, even before getting to the employer liability issue, it is 
 
 22. Id. at 36–37.  
 23. Infra Section III.B.  
 24. See Brake, supra note 20, at 39–40; see also Walker, supra note 18, at 20 (stating that 
where employees have a fear of retaliation, the employer’s compliance program suffers).  
 25. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 704, 78 Stat. 241, 257 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3 (2012)). 
 26. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (describing the severe or 
pervasive standard); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–68, 72 (1986).  
 27. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 829–30 (1991) (stating that 
courts use women’s silence to demonstrate that the harassment was not unwelcome, but the silence 
is usually attributable to shame, humiliation, fear, and dependence of the victim).  
 28. See, e.g., Gerald v. Univ. of P.R., 707 F.3d 7, 18 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that one 
incident where the supervisor grabbed plaintiff’s breast was sufficient to meet the standard). But 
see Clarke, supra note 3, at 43 (“Some courts have held that even repeated instances of unwanted 
sexual touching do not count as harassment.”); Tippett, supra note 2, at 241 (stating that some 
scholars have highlighted cases where even egregious harassment was found not to meet the 
severe or pervasive standard).  
 29. See Estrich, supra note 27, at 842, 846 (discussing how courts have a difficult time 
judging pervasiveness from a woman’s perspective); id. at 846 (“[T]he objective standard of 
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unclear whether Nina would have an actionable harassment claim had she 
chosen to bring one. 
Moving on to the fourth element of the harassment claim, even when 
the harassment claim is otherwise actionable—it is because of a protected 
trait, unwelcome, and severe or pervasive—the plaintiff still must 
establish that the employer should be held liable for the harassment 
perpetrated by its employees.30 Employers are not automatically liable for 
the harassment of their employees.31 Whether the employer can be held 
liable is determined through different tests depending on whether the 
harasser is a supervisor or a coworker.32  
If the harasser is a coworker (or a customer, client, or other third 
party), the test for determining whether the employer will be held liable 
is one of negligence—whether the employer knew or should have known 
about the harassment and failed to take appropriate steps to remedy it.33 
As should be obvious from this, if the employee who was harassed does 
not report the harassment, then it is unlikely that the court will hold that 
the employer should have known about the harassment, unless it was so 
open and notorious that everyone knew about it.34  
For instance, in our Nina story, John would not be considered Nina’s 
supervisor;35 he would be considered a coworker or maybe even a client. 
Thus, the employer would only be liable if it failed to take appropriate 
action after Nina reported. Because Nina never reported, the employer 
could not have been expected to take remedial actions. And if Nina did 
report and the employer took some reasonable measure to remedy the 
harassment (such as giving John a warning or making sure that John is 
not left alone with Nina), the employer would not be liable for the 
harassment. This is true even if Nina suffered some mental anguish or 
anxiety from the harassment, and this is true even if the employer’s 
remedy interfered with her ability to work with John and the HR 
managers he supervised.  
 
pervasiveness is defined by an idealized woman who simply may not exist. Such a woman is 
tough, not ‘hypersensitive’; she is aggressive, not passive . . . . In short, the ‘reasonable woman’ 
is very much a man.”).  
 30. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). 
 31. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804 (preserving Meritor’s 
holding on this point). 
 32. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803 (discussing the differences between supervisor harassment 
and coworker harassment); see also Tippett, supra note 2, at 238 (same).  
 33. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799; see also Grossman, supra note 9, at 8 (noting that the 
standard for coworker harassment is one of negligence).  
 34. See Grossman, supra note 9, at 50 (noting that, if victims do not complain about 
harassment, employers will not be able to remedy it).  
 35. For the definition of “supervisor,” see infra note 36.  
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If the harasser is a supervisor,36 unless the supervisor takes a “tangible 
employment action”37 against the victim, the employer has the 
opportunity to establish a two-part affirmative defense: “(a) that the 
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any 
sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”38  
The first prong is all about the employer: the employer must show that 
it took reasonable steps to prevent and correct harassment.39 The 
prevention part of this is usually very easy for employers to meet. As long 
as employers have and disseminate an anti-harassment policy that gives 
employees multiple avenues to report the harassment, employers will 
likely be able to demonstrate reasonable steps to prevent harassment.40 
Training employees and supervisors on the harassment policy also helps, 
but is not strictly necessary.41 The correction part of the first prong 
requires the employer to take reasonable steps to remedy harassment after 
 
 36. The United States Supreme Court defined “supervisor” in Vance v. Ball State Univ., 
570 U.S. 421 (2013), as someone who is “empowered by the employer to take tangible 
employment actions against the victim,” id. at 450. See also Grossman, supra note 7, at 1042 
(stating that Vance omits the consideration of “supervisors” who dictate many or all of a worker’s 
daily working conditions but lack the ultimate power over the worker’s job).  
 37. A “tangible employment action” is described as “discharge, demotion, or undesirable 
reassignment.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808. 
 38. Id. at 807; see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (applying 
the same two-part affirmative defense).  
 39. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (stating that although “proof that an employer had 
promulgated an antiharassment policy with a complaint procedure is not necessary in every 
instance as a matter of law,” the need for one is important to the first element of the defense).  
 40. See, e.g., Lauderdale v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 512 F.3d 157, 164 (5th Cir. 
2007) (stating that the employer satisfied the first prong of the affirmative defense “by virtue of 
its institutional policies and educational programs regarding sexual harassment”); see also 
Grossman, supra note 9, at 10, 12 (noting that employers can prove prevention fairly easily 
through having an adequate policy be distributed and appropriate training).  
 41. See, e.g., Lauderdale, 512 F.3d at 164 (noting with approval the employer’s training 
programs for sexual harassment); Grossman, supra note 9, at 13 (noting that training is not 
specifically required but can be a factor in favor of demonstrating that the employer was 
reasonable in its prevention efforts). But see Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a 
Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Development Jurisprudence of Education 
and Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 4, 29–30, 
35, 38 (2001) [hereinafter Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention] (discussing the fact that, even 
though courts use training programs as evidence of employers’ prevention efforts, there is actually 
a dearth of research indicating that training programs are successful in preventing harassment); 
Susan Bisom-Rapp, Sex Harassment Training Must Change: The Case for Legal Incentives for 
Transformative Education and Prevention, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 62, 68 (2018) [hereinafter 
Bisom-Rapp, Training Must Change], https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/ 
3/2018/06/71-Stan.-L.-Rev.-Online-Bisom-Rapp.pdf [https://perma.cc/VPW6-DGGC] (stating 
that sexual harassment training programs, “as generally practiced, do[] not prevent harassment”).  
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it is reported to them.42 Obviously, employers do not always succeed in 
proving this, but as long as they take some reasonable steps to stop the 
harassment after it is reported to them, they should be able to succeed on 
this prong.43  
The second prong is all about the plaintiff: the employer has to prove 
that the plaintiff failed to take advantage of preventive opportunities or 
to otherwise avoid harm.44 If the plaintiff delays reporting, the employer 
will likely win on this prong of the affirmative defense.45  
For instance, in Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp.,46 the plaintiff was 
harassed by her supervisor on March 13, June 12, June 13, June 17, and 
June 18.47 She reported the harassment on June 20.48 The court held that 
the delay was unreasonable despite the fact that the plaintiff reported 
shortly after the harassment had started escalating.49 In another case, the 
court held that even seventeen days was too long to delay reporting.50 
Notably, even if employees delay reporting because they are at a new job 
 
 42. See, e.g., Lauderdale, 512 F.3d at 165 (stating that the employer promptly investigating 
the plaintiff’s allegations of harassment and disciplining the harasser were sufficient actions to 
satisfy the employer’s first prong of the affirmative defense).  
 43. See, e.g., Conatzer v. Med. Prof’l Bldg. Servs., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1270 (N.D. 
Okla. 2003) (stating that the employer can prove the first prong of the affirmative defense when 
it responds to a report of harassment “in a prompt and reasonable manner”), aff’d sub nom. 
Conatzer v. Med. Prof’l Bldg. Servs. Corp., 95 F. App’x 276 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Grossman, 
supra note 9, at 15–16 (stating that adequate correction requires employers to have an appropriate 
grievance procedure and respond appropriately to complaints by taking actions “reasonably 
calculated to stop the harassment”); Tippett, supra note 2, at 246–47 (stating that employers do 
not consider an employer’s failure to fire a harasser to be unreasonable and that this prong can 
often be satisfied by a warning or transferring the victim away from the harasser).  
 44. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08 (“[W]hile proof that an employee failed to fulfill the 
corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an 
unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration 
of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden under the second element of 
the defense.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 9, at 21 (“[C]ourts have strictly enforced the victim’s 
duty to complain.”); Hébert, supra note 16, at 721–29 (discussing cases where victims failed to 
report right away and courts held that they were unreasonable, thereby allowing the employer to 
win on the affirmative defense); Lawton, supra note 8, at 254–59 (discussing cases where 
employees were afraid to report harassment because of retaliation but the courts held that a delay 
of as little as six weeks from the first incident could mean that the plaintiffs “unreasonably failed 
to avail themselves of their employer’s grievance mechanism[s]”). 
 46. 83 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (E.D. Mo. 2000).  
 47. Id. at 1033. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. at 1034.  
 50. Conatzer v. Med. Prof’l Bldg. Servs., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1270 (N.D. Okla. 
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when they first experience the harassment, the delay is not excused.51 In 
one case, the court held that a seven-day delay in complaining was 
unreasonable even though the harassment began on the plaintiff’s first 
day of employment.52 
And even if the plaintiff’s delay is because she fears retaliation, the 
courts will likely find her behavior unreasonable.53 In one case, the 
plaintiff was deemed unreasonable in failing to report even though her 
supervisor told her she would be terminated if she made such a report.54 
In another especially egregious case, the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed 
despite the fact that her supervisor had forcibly raped her and had showed 
her his gun several times; the court held that her fear was not enough to 
excuse her delay in reporting.55  
Perhaps most frustratingly, some courts have held that if the employer 
satisfies prong one of the affirmative defense (takes reasonable steps to 
prevent and correct harassment), it does not have to also satisfy the 
second prong of the defense.56 These courts have so held even though the 
United States Supreme Court made clear in both Burlington Industries, 
Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton that the test is 
conjunctive.57 When employees do gather up enough nerve to report 
harassment, they frequently experience retaliation.58 And as 
demonstrated below, plaintiffs often have difficulty with this claim as 
well. 
 
 51. Hébert, supra note 16, at 728 (citing Dennis v. Nevada, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1185 (D. 
Nev. 2003)) (discussing a case in which the plaintiff failed to report harassment right away 
because she was a probationary employee and the court held that her failure to report was 
unreasonable).  
 52. Marsicano v. Am. Soc’y of Safety Eng’rs, No. 97 C 7819, 1998 WL 603128, at *7 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 4, 1998).  
 53. See Grossman, supra note 9, at 22 (stating that a generalized fear of retaliation is likely 
not going to be a sufficient justification for not promptly reporting); Hébert, supra note 16, at 725 
(stating that subjective fear of retaliation is not enough to allow the plaintiff to survive the 
defendant’s proof of the affirmative defense).  
 54. Sconce v. Tandy Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 773, 778 (W.D. Ky. 1998).  
 55. Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1276, 1289–90 (11th Cir. 
2003) (per curiam).  
 56. See, e.g., McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 772 (8th Cir. 2004) (allowing 
the employer to meet the affirmative defense despite the inability to prove the second element); 
Brown v. Henderson, 155 F. Supp. 2d 502, 512 (M.D.N.C. 2000) (holding that the employer need 
not prove the second element when the first element is met); Jaudon v. Elder Health, Inc., 125 F. 
Supp. 2d 153, 164 (D. Md. 2000) (same).  
 57. Grossman, supra note 7, at 1044; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 
775, 807 (1998) (stating that the affirmative defense “comprises two necessary elements: 
(a) . . . and (b)” (emphasis added)).  
 58. E.g., U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at 16. 
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C.  Retaliation Basics  
Section 704(a) of Title VII states:  
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to discriminate against any of his 
employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an 
unlawful employment practice by this title, or because he has 
made a charge . . . or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing . . . .59  
To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, plaintiffs must 
demonstrate (1) protected activity, either participation or opposition; (2) 
an adverse employment action; and (3) causation between the two.60 All 
three of these elements present roadblocks for a plaintiff bringing a 
retaliation claim. 
First, to meet the “protected activity” element, a plaintiff either needs 
to engage in “participation”—bringing a charge of discrimination or 
participating in any proceeding—or “opposition”—opposing a practice 
made unlawful by Title VII.61 Participation activities, such as complaints 
or charges filed with the EEOC or a state antidiscrimination agency, or a 
lawsuit in court, are typically external to the company.62 Opposition 
activity, such as complaining to an HR officer or supervisor, is typically 
internal and often informal.63 
The participation clause receives almost absolute protection.64 Courts 
have held that participation is protected even if the underlying claim is 
without merit—and even when the plaintiff was unreasonable in 
believing it did have merit.65 For example, imagine an employee files a 
charge with the EEOC alleging that he was harassed because of his class 
(e.g., because he was poor). Title VII clearly does not protect against 
income-based discrimination or harassment66 and yet, as long as the 
employee filed the charge in good faith, honestly believing it was a valid 
charge, he would be protected if he experienced retaliation for having 
filed that charge.67  
 
 59. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 704(a), 78 Stat. 241, 257 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012)).  
 60. See, e.g., Durant v. D.C. Gov’t, 875 F.3d 685, 696–97 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing Holcomb 
v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 901–02 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).  
 62. B. Glenn George, Revenge, 83 TUL. L. REV. 439, 446–47 (2008). 
 63. Id. at 448. 
 64. Id. at 446–47. 
 65. See, e.g., Glover v. S.C. Law Enf’t Div., 170 F.3d 411, 412 (4th Cir. 1999).  
 66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 67. See Sanders v. Madison Square Garden, LP, 525 F. Supp. 2d 364, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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The opposition clause, however, does not receive such absolute 
protection.68 Instead, courts have required the plaintiff to demonstrate 
that she had a reasonable and good faith belief that the conduct she 
complained about was unlawful.69 In the context of an employee’s 
complaints about sexual harassment, the employee would have to 
demonstrate that she had a reasonable belief she was the victim of 
unlawful harassment.70 As discussed above, one element the plaintiff 
must prove is that the harassment was “severe or pervasive.”71 Individual 
instances of harassment, unless they amount to an unwanted touching that 
is sexual in nature, are not likely to be considered “severe.”72 For 
instance, rubbing someone’s shoulders is not likely to be considered 
severe but grabbing someone’s breasts would likely be seen as severe.73 
If conduct is not severe, it must be pervasive.74 Thus, if a woman 
complains about one offensive or demeaning statement or joke, and the 
employer retaliates against her for complaining, courts will likely hold 
that she did not have a reasonable, good faith belief that the conduct she 
complained about violated Title VII, and her retaliation claim will fail.75  
This “reasonable belief” rule interacts with the second step of the 
employer’s affirmative defense in harassment claims in especially 
pernicious ways. As explained above, employers can avoid liability for a 
supervisor’s harassment if they can establish a two-prong affirmative 
defense.76 The second prong of the affirmative defense is that the plaintiff 
failed to take advantage of preventative opportunities.77 The most 
 
 68. Thus, using the above example, because a reasonable person would not believe that 
income-based discrimination or harassment is unlawful under Title VII, if an employee 
complained to HR that he was the victim of income-based harassment, this would not be protected 
activity and the employer could terminate him for that complaint with impunity.  
 69. See Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001) (per curiam) (assuming 
without deciding that the reasonable, good faith belief rule is correct). 
 70. Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994) (per curiam); see Breeden, 532 
U.S. at 270. 
 71. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). 
 72. See Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 
(1998)).  
 73. See, e.g., Gerald v. Univ. of P.R., 707 F.3d 7, 18 (1st Cir. 2013) (stating that a single 
incident in which the supervisor grabbed plaintiff’s breast was sufficient to meet the standard). 
But see Clarke, supra note 3, at 7 (stating that some courts have held that even repeated instances 
of unwanted sexual touching do not count as harassment).   
 74. Lauderdale v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 512 F.3d 157, 163 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(“Frequent incidents of harassment, though not severe, can reach the level of ‘pervasive’ . . . .”). 
 75. Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271; see also Grossman, supra note 7, at 1040 (stating that the 
Breeden standard “unleash[ed] a torrent of bad case law”).  
 76. See supra Section I.B. 
 77. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
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common way the employer proves this prong is to show that the plaintiff 
delayed in reporting the harassment.78 When this affirmative defense is 
combined with the reasonable belief rule, the catch-22 emerges.79 
Assume a victim of harassment reports harassment right away, when it 
first occurs, and assume the harassment is verbal and not physical. If the 
employee is retaliated against, she will likely lose the retaliation claim 
because the court will hold that she did not have a reasonable belief that 
the harassment she complained of was “severe or pervasive.”80 But if she 
waits until she has been harassed several more times, so that she has a 
reasonable belief that the harassment she experienced was “pervasive,” 
she will very likely lose on the harassment claim because the employer 
will be able to establish that she failed to take advantage of preventive 
opportunities by complaining earlier.81 In other words, she loses her 
retaliation claim if she reports too early, and she loses her harassment 
claim if she reports too late.  
The second hurdle a plaintiff experiences in bringing a valid 
retaliation claim is that she has to prove that she suffered an adverse 
employment action.82 The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington 
Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White83 announced the standard for 
determining whether a retaliatory employment action is sufficiently 
severe to qualify as an adverse employment action. The Court held that 
to meet the standard, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the action “would 
have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee.”84 The action 
must be “harmful to the point that [it] could well dissuade a reasonable 
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”85 
Although this seems like a fairly broad standard,86 the lower courts 
have held that many actions are not “materially adverse.”87 Of relevance 
to this Article, courts almost uniformly hold that “shunning,” 
 
 78. See Grossman, supra note 7, at 1045 & n.103 (“[C]ourts took [an] . . . unrealistic view 
of how quickly and assertively employees must complain.”).  
 79. See id. at 1045 (noting that at the same time courts were insisting that employees rush 
to file complaints for fear of forfeiting their harassment claims, the courts were also weakening 
retaliation protections).  
 80. Id. at 1046.  
 81. Id. at 1044–46. 
 82. See, e.g., Durant v. D.C. Gov’t, 875 F.3d 685, 696–97 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 83. 548 U.S. 53 (2006).  
 84. Id. at 57. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Grossman, supra note 7, at 1039 (construing the Burlington standard broadly); 
Walker, supra note 18, at 21.  
 87. See Sandra F. Sperino, Retaliation and the Reasonable Person, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2031, 
2041–42 (2015).  
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“ostracizing,” and being harassed do not rise to the level of an adverse 
employment action.88  
The courts’ reasoning in these cases varies widely. Often courts 
simply hold, without much explanation, that the harm was not significant 
enough to deter someone from filing a charge.89 These courts argue that 
“retaliation law should not respond to trivial harms, petty slights, or 
minor annoyances.”90 Scholars have also theorized that when judges 
write opinions holding that certain conduct does not constitute an adverse 
employment action, they tend to “issue broad opinions that appear to 
hold, as a matter of law, that a particular action is never serious enough 
to create liability.”91 Lower courts then rely on these opinions in 
subsequent cases where a similar adverse action is present.92 Professor 
Sandra F. Sperino calls this the “problem of perceived precedent.”93 Or 
perhaps, the reason for the courts’ constrained interpretation of what 
constitutes an adverse employment action is that federal judges, who have 
lifetime job security, are less likely to feel threatened or deterred by 
actions that would deter a reasonable worker, who does not enjoy such 
job security.94 
The third hurdle in bringing a successful retaliation claim is that the 
plaintiff must prove causation—she must prove that her complaint 
(“protected activity”) was a but-for cause of the adverse employment 
action she suffered.95 Employers are often smart enough to hide any 
retaliatory motive. Furthermore, unless a plaintiff has been a perfect 
 
 88. See, e.g., Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1106–07 (7th Cir. 
2012) (being called “cry babies” and “trouble makers” by supervisor was not adverse action); 
Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657–58 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that coworker 
harassment, including name-calling, physical intimidation, false accusations, vandalizing 
belongings, and verbal threats, was not retaliatory); Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 790–92 
(7th Cir. 2009) (holding that supervisors yelling at plaintiff and physically isolating him from 
other employees did not rise to level of adverse employment action); Reeves v. Tenn. Farmers 
Mut. Ins.,  No. 1:12–cv–00018, 2013 WL 2177918, at *9, *12–13 (M.D. Tenn. May 20, 2013) 
(finding that intimidation, unprofessional behavior, and rudeness would not dissuade a reasonable 
employee from complaining), aff’d, 555 F. App’x 509 (6th Cir. 2014); Clay v. Lafarge N. Am., 
985 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1030–33 (S.D. Iowa 2013) (holding that shunning and ostracism at work 
did not satisfy the standard). 
 89. See Brake, supra note 5, at 32–33 (stating that courts tend to assume that people will 
put up with a lot of “pushback from colleagues without it weakening their resolve to complain”).  
 90. Sperino, supra note 87, at 2042. 
 91. Id. at 2055. 
 92. Id. at 2057. 
 93. Id. at 2056–61.  
 94. See Estrich, supra note 27, at 846–47 (discussing the distance between appellate judges 
and everyday women who need to keep their jobs and thus do not object to or report harassment 
like judges think they should). 
 95. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013) (requiring but-for 
causation in retaliation cases under Title VII).  
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employee, an employer can easily generate a legitimate, nonretaliatory 
motive for the adverse employment action. Often the only evidence 
plaintiffs have to prove causation is the temporal proximity between the 
two events. Thus, if a woman complains about harassment one day and 
is terminated the next, that is pretty strong evidence that retaliation was 
at play.96 But most employers are savvy enough to avoid such a close 
temporal proximity. And some courts hold that even a two- or three-
month temporal proximity is too long to be indicative of a retaliatory 
motive.97 
Now, revisiting Nina’s story, change the facts to imagine that Nina 
decided to report to the director of HR (John’s boss) the harassment she 
experienced at the HR retreat. Further, imagine that John is angry with 
her and refuses to talk to or call her to get her legal advice or schedule 
trainings at the plants (something that comprises a large part of Nina’s 
job). Nina is not sure whether he has turned the other HR managers 
against her, but she does notice that the frequency of calls from the eight 
plant managers John supervises has decreased dramatically. At 
headquarters, where Nina works, she notices some of the other lawyers 
hunched together, whispering to each other while glancing over at her, 
which she takes as a pretty clear sign that they know about her complaint 
and are talking about her. At the next company-wide HR event six months 
later, John and the other plant managers that he supervises refuse to talk 
to her and ignore her when she tries to approach them. All of this is very 
upsetting to Nina who, as stated in the original story, is a people pleaser 
and usually gets along with everyone.  
If Nina filed a retaliation claim against the employer, it would not 
stand much chance of success. The first hurdle would be the reasonable 
belief rule.98 In other words, when Nina reported harassment, did she 
have a reasonable belief that the harassment she was reporting was 
unlawful? This is a close call, but at least some courts would say that the 
two instances of harassment by John, even with him touching her thigh, 
would not be considered severe or pervasive; therefore, Nina, especially 
because she is expected to know the law,99 could not have reasonably 
 
 96. See, e.g., Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 563–64 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(holding that termination two days after protected expression was sufficiently suspicious, unless 
other evidence showed that plaintiff would have been terminated anyway).  
 97. See, e.g., Sherris v. City Colls. of Chi., No. 15 C 9078, 2018 WL 999902, at *8 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 21, 2018) (holding that even a seven-week time gap between plaintiff’s initial report of 
harassment and termination was too long to support a finding of retaliation).  
 98. See Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (per curiam). 
 99. To be clear, judges often hold nonlawyers to a reasonable belief standard that assumes 
knowledge of the appropriate law, including circuit-specific precedent. See, e.g., Brianne J. 
Gorod, Rejecting “Reasonableness”: A New Look at Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 56 
AM. U. L. REV. 1469, 1492 & n.104 (2007) (criticizing a decision where the court assumed that 
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believed that she was opposing unlawful behavior. The second hurdle 
would be establishing that the relationship-based harms Nina experienced 
were adverse employment actions.100 As discussed above and below,101 
most courts hold that these types of relationship-based harms are not 
adverse employment actions because they would not dissuade a 
reasonable worker from bringing a charge of discrimination. And yet, in 
the actual Nina story (not the modified one for purposes of analyzing the 
potential retaliation claim), Nina was dissuaded from complaining about 
the harassment because of the fear of relationship-based harms. Finally, 
Nina might have difficulty proving causation. Assuming there are no 
emails or other evidence demonstrating that John and the other HR 
managers were ignoring her because of her complaint against John, Nina 
would only have the temporal proximity between her report of the 
harassment and the ostracization she experienced. Because some of this 
did not occur until six months later at the subsequent HR retreat, most 
courts would hold that Nina could not establish causation, and her claim 
would fail.  
II.  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WORKPLACE RELATIONSHIPS  
 
 This Part will outline the argument that workplace relationships are 
important for many workers, but especially for women. Scholarship, 
caselaw, and theory all support the reality that workplace relationships 
matter. 
A.  How Workplace Relationships Interact with Harassment and 
Retaliation 
There is a great deal of evidence supporting the idea that maintaining 
relationships in the workplace motivates women to forego reporting or 
complaining about harassment. This Section first discusses some of the 
literature on this topic before turning to some specific caselaw examples.  
  
 
the appropriate benchmark for assessing the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief in reporting 
harassing behavior was the definition of sexual harassment established in the caselaw). As Gorod 
states, the courts often determine reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief based on what the law 
says, rather than what the general public believes. Id. at 1492. This approach holds plaintiffs 
responsible for understanding the current state of the law. Id. And in areas where the law 
surrounding harassment or discrimination is uncertain, Gorod points out: “If the courts cannot 
agree, how are individual citizens supposed to know?” Id. at 1495.  
 100. See, e.g., Durant v. D.C. Gov’t, 875 F.3d 685, 696–97 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 101. See supra note 88; infra Section II.A.2.  
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1.  Scholarship on Women and Workplace Relationships 
As mentioned earlier, the empirical evidence demonstrates that very 
few women complain about harassment.102 Both legal scholars and social 
scientists have discussed the reasons for this lack-of-reporting 
phenomenon. According to Professor Anne Lawton, one of the reasons 
that plaintiffs do not complain is because they are worried about making 
the workplace “unpleasant.”103 Other scholars confirm that employees do 
not report harassment in part because they are worried about the hostility 
of coworkers.104 
Professor L. Camille Hébert explained that women are socialized to 
avoid conflict and therefore are more likely than men to indicate that they 
did not report harassment because of fear of being labeled a 
troublemaker.105 Many victims who reported harassment subsequently 
had a sense that coworkers were talking about them behind their back.106 
Researchers in one study found that claiming that one has been a 
victim of discrimination is not “socially desirable” because these 
individuals risk being labeled as “hypersensitive, emotional, and 
generally unpleasant.”107 When individuals consider reporting 
discrimination or harassment, they consider how it will affect their 
relationships and influence their peers’ perceptions of them.108 They also 
worry about the backlash of confronting discrimination: “This blame-
pointing process may be unpleasant for stigmatized people, especially if 
the perpetrator of discrimination is someone whom they will have to 
interact with on a regular basis.”109 And their fears are warranted, 
according to this study. Participants in the study devalued a black man 
who attributed his failure to discrimination, rating him as more 
 
 102. See Lawton, supra note 8, at 209, 243, 254–55.  
 103. Id. at 256.  
 104. Bergman et al., supra note 19, at 237; Grossman, supra note 9, at 51–52 (noting that 
victims do not complain about harassment because they are worried about being ostracized by 
their coworkers); Walker, supra note 18, at 19 (“Being a ‘snitch,’ ‘ratting out’ or ‘telling on’ one’s 
peers is behavior that even my 6-year-old has already learned to condemn . . . .”); see also 
Fitzgerald et al., supra note 14, at 127 (stating that “[s]tudies of victims consistently report that 
fear of personal or organizational retaliation is the major constraint” for responding assertively to 
harassment). 
 105. Hébert, supra note 16, at 731 (citing Denise H. Lach & Patricia A. Gwartney-Gibbs, 
Sociological Perspectives on Sexual Harassment and Workplace Dispute Resolution, 42 J. 
VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 102 (1993)).  
 106. See, e.g., Lawton, supra note 15, at 621 (stating that the silence after she reported 
harassment was “deafening” and that she was certain that her colleagues were talking about her 
behind closed doors).  
 107. Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, Stop Complaining! The Social Costs of Making 
Attributions to Discrimination, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 254, 255 (2001).  
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. 
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“hypersensitive, emotional, argumentative, irritating, trouble making, 
and complaining.”110 This negative impression was created even when 
the study was manipulated so that discrimination was certain to have 
occurred (thus justifying the man’s attribution).111  
In addition to social pressures to maintain workplace relationships, 
some women also feel social pressure to be polite and passive rather than 
aggressive.112 Scholars explained that women often felt guilty about 
being too assertive.113 In a study of lawyers who experienced incivility or 
mistreatment, very few complained to anyone and none of them reported 
formally because they were worried about being labeled “weak” or a 
“feminazi.”114 They also did not want to be seen as “whining [or] 
complaining” and did not want to be labeled as a “troublemaker.”115 
Being ostracized by coworkers is one type of retaliation that women 
experience when they report harassment, and they often believe they are 
worse off after they report.116  
Women want to preserve not only their relationships with 
coworkers117 (who might be angry if they report harassment of a beloved 
coworker or supervisor) but they also often care deeply about preserving 
the relationship with the harasser himself.118 Women often respond 
passively to harassment by a supervisor to remain friendly and preserve 
the working relationship with the supervisor.119 Some victims of 
harassment are worried that the harasser will lose his job and that the 
 
 110. Id. at 261.  
 111. Id. at 262.  
 112. Id. at 256 (pointing to a study suggesting that one of the perceived costs of reporting is 
the violation of norms governing polite behavior); Janet K. Swim & Lauri L. Hyers, Excuse Me—
What Did You Just Say?!: Women’s Public and Private Responses to Sexist Remarks, 35 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 68, 69 (1999).   
 113. See, e.g., Fitzgerald et al., supra note 14, at 127.  
 114. Cortina et al., supra note 13, at 249, 251.  
 115. Id. at 266. 
 116. Hébert, supra note 16, at 741; see also Bodensteiner, supra note 7, at 38–39 (stating 
that when those who complain “are disliked and viewed as ‘troublemakers’ [or] ‘hypersensitive,’ 
then complaining carries a social cost”). 
 117. See Hébert, supra note 16, at 740 (stating that women often believe that reporting sexual 
harassment will prevent them from being accepted by their coworkers and many women believe 
that acceptance is “critical”).   
 118. See, e.g., Fitzgerald et al., supra note 14, at 122 (stating that many victims are reluctant 
to cause problems for the harasser); Hébert, supra note 16, at 739 (stating that women are more 
often concerned about harming the harasser because they are socialized to be more relationship-
oriented than men); see also Grossman, supra note 7, at 51–52 (noting that some women do not 
want to report harassment by a supervisor because they fear losing the mentoring relationship they 
have with the supervisor).   
 119. See Bingham & Scherer, supra note 14, at 253; Hébert, supra note 16, at 739. 
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harasser’s family members would suffer as well.120 Other scholars 
confirmed that one inhibitor to reporting harassment was “not wanting to 
hurt the man involved—clearly a gender-linked cultural value.”121  
Both Professor Hébert and the EEOC Task Force Report explain that 
women’s primary objective after experiencing harassment is to preserve 
the relationship, rather than to punish the harasser.122 As stated by 
Professor Hébert: “[E]xpecting women to react to sexually harassing 
conduct in a way that is different than the manner in which they have 
been socialized—and to react that way immediately and as their first 
response to such conduct—punishes women for acting in precisely the 
ways that they are generally expected to act.”123  
The research discussed thus far has addressed why women do not 
report harassment at all or delay doing so. Professor Sperino’s work 
addresses whether employees would consider various harms to be 
“adverse,” such that they would dissuade employees from reporting 
discrimination.124 Her study revealed that many individuals would find 
relationship-based harms to be materially adverse.125 Professor Sperino 
conducted an empirical study using her law students, asking them to 
imagine that they witnessed discrimination in the workplace.126 The study 
 
 120. Cummings & Armenta, supra note 13, at 278 (stating that when women are asked to 
punish hypothetical harassers, they are often unwilling to punish them out of fear that the harasser 
could lose his job or innocent family members might suffer); see also Hébert, supra note 16, at 
739 (discussing how women are less likely to report for fear that reporting would harm the 
harasser). 
 121. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 14, at 127. Other literature describes the fact that a woman’s 
normal response to incidents of harassment is to ignore or avoid it in large part because women 
“choose to remain friendly in order to maintain comfortable working relationships,” and that “this 
behavior is consistent with traditional . . . relationship-oriented feminine behavior.” Suzanne L. 
Osman, Victim Resistance: Theory and Data on Understanding Perceptions of Sexual 
Harassment, 50 SEX ROLES 267, 267 (2004). Osman explains that because women desire to 
maintain friendly relationships at work, their most assertive response might be asking the 
perpetrator to stop. Id. Although, sometimes this approach backfires because men might see 
friendly behavior as sexual interest, even when the woman says to stop. Id. at 270. Some men in 
this study interpreted smiling as sexual interest. Id. at 273. 
 122. See U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at 40 (stating that many employees avoid reporting 
harassment because they do not want a coworker to lose his job over relatively minor harassing 
behavior; they simply want the harassment to stop); Hébert, supra note 16, at 732.  
 123. Hébert, supra note 16, at 733; see also Lawton, supra note 8, at 209 (“[I]f the vast 
majority of harassment victims do not report harassment, then the reasonable response is not to 
report . . . .”).  
 124. See Sperino, supra note 87, at 2042–43. 
 125. See id. at 2044; see also Walker, supra note 18, at 19 (stating that retaliation can be 
“exceedingly subtle”).  
 126. Sperino, supra note 87, at 2043. Of course, the scenario in Professor Sperino’s study is 
a bit different than what this Article discusses, because in her study, participants did not 
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then asked the participants questions about whether certain anticipated 
actions would dissuade them from complaining about the discrimination 
to an employer.127 The survey results revealed that many study 
participants believed that various employment actions would be 
materially adverse in situations where courts have routinely held those 
employment actions to not be materially adverse.128 Of relevance here, 
50.53% of participants said that social ostracism by coworkers would 
dissuade them from reporting discrimination.129  
2.  Caselaw on Relationship-Based Harms 
As mentioned above, many plaintiffs claim retaliation when the only 
(or primary) harm they experienced was relationship-based harm (and 
they almost always lose). For instance, in Dennis v. Nevada,130 the 
plaintiff’s retaliation claim failed because the court held that the 
ostracization she experienced by her coworkers, along with being 
assigned undesirable shifts, was not enough to constitute an adverse 
employment action.131 In Hellman v. Weisberg,132 the plaintiff alleged 
retaliation after she participated in an investigation of a discrimination 
complaint.133 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that she received 
“snubbing” from her coworkers, but because the court had previously 
held that ostracism by coworkers does not constitute an adverse 
employment action unless it has an effect on the ability to do the job, the 
ostracism she suffered was mostly social in nature and therefore was not 
actionable.134 
 
experience harassment directly; they witnessed someone else experiencing discrimination or 
harassment.  
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. at 2045.  
 129. Id. Professor Brake agrees that courts often are not in tune with how reasonable 
employees will react: “[S]hunning the complainant and siding with the accused appears highly 
likely to dissuade many, if not most, persons from complaining.” Brake, supra note 5, at 34. In 
fact, Professor Brake notes that some research on workplace dynamics indicates that the harm 
from ostracism is actually worse from coworkers than supervisors. Id. at 35 (“[S]hunning, social 
exclusion, and incivility [by coworkers] push targeted employees to leave their employers at a 
greater rate than similar conduct by supervisors.”).  
 130. 282 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (D. Nev. 2003). 
 131. Id. at 1186.  
 132. 360 F. App’x 776 (9th Cir. 2009).  
 133. Id. at 777.  
 134. Id. at 778–79; see also Mannat v. Bank of Am., 339 F.3d 792, 803 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(stating that ostracism is not an adverse employment action); Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 
F.3d 917, 929 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that ostracism suffered at the hands of coworkers cannot 
constitute an adverse employment action).  
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Similarly, in Recio v. Creighton University,135 the plaintiff argued that 
after she filed an EEOC complaint, she suffered “shunning” by her 
coworkers.136 The court held that the instances of ostracism experienced 
by the plaintiff were no more than “nonactionable petty slights” under 
Burlington.137 In Rennard v. Woodworkers Supply, Inc.,138 the plaintiff 
testified that she was shunned by her coworkers.139 The court held that 
although coworker retaliatory harassment can sometimes constitute an 
adverse employment action, it will only rise to this level if management 
either orchestrated the harassment or knew about it and acquiesced in it, 
and there was no evidence of that occurring here.140  
In Brown v. Advocate South Suburban Hospital,141 after reporting the 
harassment, the plaintiffs were called crybabies, troublemakers, and 
spoiled children by their managers.142 The court stated that this behavior 
does not constitute a materially adverse employment action and that 
“‘[p]ersonality conflicts at work that generate antipathy’ and ‘snubbing 
by supervisors and co-workers’ are not actionable . . . .”143 
Finally, Nina feared relationship-based retaliation. Nina first feared 
that other HR managers would think poorly of her if she made a fuss 
about John’s boorish behavior. She also feared that, if she reported John’s 
behavior, the HR director for the corporation and the general counsel 
would perceive her as “whiny,” “ultra-sensitive,” and “not a good fit.” 
She was even worried about harming her relationship with John. As much 
as John’s behavior irritated her, Nina did not want him to get in trouble. 
She knew John had a wife and a small child and that if he was fired for 
harassment, it would likely affect his family. Thus, although she was not 
seriously worried about losing her job or suffering any other type of 
economic, tangible harm, the concern over relationship-based harms was 
enough to keep her from reporting the harassment.  
 
 135. 521 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 2008).  
 136. Id. at 939.  
 137. Id. at 940–41 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69 (2006)).  
 138. 101 F. App’x 296 (10th Cir. 2004).  
 139. Id. at 308.  
 140. Id.  
 141. 700 F.3d 1101 (7th Cir. 2012).  
 142. Id. at 1107.  
 143. Id. (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)); see 
also Fercello v. Cty. of Ramsey, 612 F.3d 1069, 1081 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that coworkers’ 
actions of making plaintiff feel unwelcome at meetings, rolling their eyes at her, interrupting her, 
and ignoring her contributions were not sufficient to be an adverse employment action). But see 
Burrell v. Shepard, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13–14 (D.D.C. 2018) (denying summary judgment for 
employer on plaintiff’s retaliation claim where plaintiff alleged “that her coworkers refused to 
speak to her, ‘making it very difficult for her to perform her assigned tasks,’” and “made 
derogatory comments about [her] on social media”).  
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To be clear, although many of the victims in the above cases are 
women, certainly some men suffer from relationship-based harms. For 
instance, in Somoza v. University of Denver,144 the plaintiff was a man 
who complained of retaliation that consisted of his coworkers laughing at 
his opinions and talking behind his back.145 The court held these actions 
were not materially adverse.146  
Interestingly, the results of Professor Sperino’s study are inconsistent 
with the literature discussed above. In her study, when she asked her 
students whether they would be deterred from reporting discrimination if 
they knew they would suffer “social ostracism” by their coworkers, more 
men (57.69%) than women (42.86%) stated that they would be deterred 
by such relationship-based harms.147 One explanation for this is simply 
that it does not necessarily reflect reality, either because the research 
participants were law students or simply because they were research 
participants—other scholars have noted that that there is often a “striking 
gap between expected and actual responses to bias”; people think they 
will report much more often than they actually do.148 
Even if men sometimes suffer relationship-based harms, the above 
discussion in this Section should make clear that it is more often women 
who worry about their workplace relationships.149 And regardless of the 
employee’s sex, the reality is that many employees will forego reporting 
harassment or discrimination because they fear relationship-based 
harms.150  
Even if it is intuitive to some readers that women are more likely than 
men to be dissuaded from reporting by relationship-based harms, the 
Section below both reinforces what might be intuitive to many and also 
 
 144. 513 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2008).  
 145. Id. at 1215. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Sperino, supra note 87, at 2046.  
 148. Bodensteiner, supra note 7, at 38 (quoting Brake, supra note 20, at 30); Fitzgerald et 
al., supra note 14, at 119 (noting that real victims “behave quite differently than research 
participants or the general public say they would behave”);  Grossman, supra note 9, at 25 (stating 
that real victims often do not behave like fake victims in research studies); Swim & Hyers, supra 
note 112, at 80–81, 85 (discussing studies that demonstrated that women believed they would be 
more direct and more likely to confront harassment than how they would actually behave if it 
happened to them). In other words, merely labeling a remark as prejudicial and wanting to respond 
is not predictive of actually responding because there are normative pressures not to respond.  
 149. See, e.g., Bingham & Scherer, supra note 14, at 260 (stating that the response to 
harassment was gendered; women talked to family and friends about harassment more often than 
men) (stating that women find more support in friendships than men do); Hébert, supra note 16, 
at 732 (stating that women are more comfortable using informal means of trying to resolve 
problems in the workplace because formal means are inconsistent with the manner in which they 
view conflict resolution).  
 150. See Sperino, supra note 87, at 2046. 
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explains why—why is it that women are more likely to worry about 
workplace relationships than men? This Article explains how one 
feminist theory can help to reinforce this intuitive claim that women are 
generally more relationship-oriented than men. As an initial disclaimer: 
despite the Author’s belief that it is more often women who fear and 
experience these relationship-based harms in the workplace, the reforms 
proposed below should, of course, apply to all sexes and genders. 
B.  Relational Feminism Basics151 
The relational (or cultural)152 feminism movement is said to have 
begun with Psychologist Carol Gilligan and her influential book, In a 
Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development.153 
Gilligan’s book is based on research projects involving moral choice.154 
In her studies, she began to hear distinctions in the voices of men and 
women.155 Prior research regarding moral development had always been 
based almost exclusively on male subjects, which allowed male norms to 
prevail, and women were therefore seen as deviant from the norm.156 For 
instance, in one psychologist’s study, models for a healthy life cycle were 
men who seem distant in their relationships and who subordinate 
relationships to achievement.157 Because women keep and place an 
emphasis on relationships, they appear deficient in moral developmental 
studies that focus only on men.158 
Although Gilligan never announced a new theory of cultural or 
relational feminism, her work is said to have begun the relational 
feminism strand of feminist theory and feminist legal theory.159 
According to relational feminism, “women value intimacy, develop a 
capacity for nurturance, and an ethic of care for the ‘other’ with which 
we are connected, just as we learn to dread and fear separation from the 
 
 151. This Section is derived in part from an earlier work of mine. See Nicole Buonocore 
Porter, Embracing Caregiving and Respecting Choice: An Essay on the Debate over Changing 
Gender Norms, 41 SW. L. REV. 1, 6–11 (2011) (discussing cultural feminism). 
 152. Different scholars use different words—either “cultural” feminism or “relational” 
feminism. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, Neofeminism, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1325, 1338 (2013). This Article 
uses them interchangeably, though it prefers “relational” feminism because it is more descriptive, 
but so much of the early scholarship on this theory uses “cultural” feminism. 
 153. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S 
DEVELOPMENT (1982); see also Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 15 
(1988) (“‘Cultural feminism’ . . . is in large part defined by Gilligan’s book.”). 
 154. GILLIGAN, supra note 153, at 2–3.  
 155. Id. at 1.  
 156. Id. at 6, 18–19, 22.  
 157. Id. at 154.  
 158. Id. at 170.  
 159. See, e.g., West, supra note 153, at 15.  
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other.”160 Women also view themselves as fundamentally connected to 
others in their lives.161  
Gilligan’s discussion of women’s emphasis on relationships is 
noteworthy—a search in the electronic version of the book reveals the 
word “relationship” 389 times. Gilligan states that women often “try to 
change the rules in order to preserve relationships,”162 and that women’s 
sense of self is “organized around being able to make and then to maintain 
affiliations and relationships.”163 As seen in some harassment and 
retaliation cases, Gilligan notes that women have difficulty putting 
themselves first.164 And finally, Gilligan notes that “in all of the women’s 
descriptions, identity is defined in context of relationship . . . .”165 
As stated by Professor Robin West, one of the most prominent 
proponents of relational feminism,166 “women are more nurturant, caring, 
loving and responsible to others than are men.”167 These attributes dictate 
the way that women define social relationships: “[W]omen view the 
morality of actions against a standard of responsibility to others, rather 
than against a standard of rights and autonomy from others.”168 Another 
scholar describes cultural feminism as an ideology of female nature 
reappropriated by feminists themselves in an effort to validate 
undervalued female attributes.169 As Professor West argues, women are 
more likely to sacrifice themselves in the care of others—what has been 
called “care unconstrained by justice.”170 Professor West argues that 
women often identify themselves by referencing their relationships.171 
Not only do women enjoy the intimacy of relationships, according to 
Professor West, but they also fear separation from others.172 
Professor Aya Gruber describes the basic premise of cultural 
feminism as women “valuing intimacy, prioritizing relationships over 
competition, and being caring rather than dominating.”173 Professor 
 
 160. Id.   
 161. Id. at 17.  
 162. GILLIGAN, supra note 153, at 44.  
 163. Id. at 48 (quoting JEAN BAKER MILLER, TOWARD A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 83 
(1976)).  
 164. See id. at 66.  
 165. Id. at 160.  
 166. Linda C. McClain, The Liberal Future of Relational Feminism: Robin West’s Caring 
for Justice, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 477, 478 (1999).  
 167. West, supra note 153, at 17. 
 168. Id. at 17–18.  
 169. Linda Alcoff, Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in 
Feminist Theory, 13 SIGNS 405, 408 (1988).  
 170. McClain, supra note 166, at 482–83.  
 171. West, supra note 153, at 16–17.  
 172. Id. at 18–19, 28.  
 173. Gruber, supra note 152, at 1338.  
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Gruber explains that the women described in Gilligan’s book are 
communicative and not aggressive and value relationships over 
individual interests.174 Professor Martha Chamallas also states that 
“[c]ultural [feminism] emphasize[s] relationships, the value of intimacy, 
[and] the importance of . . . caretaking.”175 This emphasis on relationships 
means that women suffer more from the harm of separation and isolation 
than men.176 Another scholar describes relational feminism as being 
“premised on the centrality of relationships” in women’s lives.177 This 
same scholar also argues that relational feminism pleads for the nurturing 
of relationships and for legal intervention into relationships that cause 
harm.178 
Even though much of cultural feminism has been focused on women’s 
caregiving capacity, Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow has addressed 
whether and how women’s “different voice” could affect them in other 
areas of life, such as in the workplace and how they handle dispute 
resolution.179 For instance, she queried whether women’s care for others 
could be helpful to women in unions; if women are more “self-sacrificing, 
then they should be naturals for the collective action of unions in which 
all work is for the [greater] good . . . .”180 Professor Menkel-Meadow also 
noted that women’s ethic of care could affect how they negotiate; 
specifically, she believed that women were more likely to compromise in 
negotiation when there is an ongoing relationship involved.181 Although 
not reporting harassment because of fear of harming workplace 
relationships is different from the more typical illustrations of relational 
feminism, it is easy to see that many women’s self-identification as being 
relationship-oriented affects their willingness to potentially harm their 
workplace relationships by reporting harassment.  
 
 174. Id. at 1338.   
 175. Martha Chamallas, Past as Prologue: Old and New Feminisms, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & 
L. 157, 162 (2010).  
 176. McClain, supra note 166, at 493.  
 177. Roxana Banu, A Relational Feminist Approach to Conflict of Laws, 24 MICH. J. GENDER 
& L. 1, 17 (2017).  
 178. Id.  
 179. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory, 23 PAC. L.J. 1493, 
1528 (1992). 
 180. Id. (footnote omitted). Although not relying on cultural feminism, I have made similar 
arguments with respect to women and unions. See, e.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter, Women, 
Unions, and Negotiation, 14 NEV. L.J. 465, 487–91 (2014). 
 181. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Women in Dispute Resolution: Parties, Lawyers and Dispute 
Resolvers: What Difference Does “Gender Difference” Make, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2012, 
at 5. Although, to be clear, Professor Menkel-Meadow argues in this piece that her impression of 
gender difference has changed. She used to think that women’s “different voice” would bring a 
change to dispute resolution practice but now thinks that, although gender difference matters, 
context may matter more. Id. at 4–5.  
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As for why cultural feminists believe that women are more focused 
on relationships, Professor West argues that it is because women raise 
children more often than men do.182 Because of this fact, Professor West 
argues that women are “capable of a degree of physical as well as psychic 
intimacy with the other which greatly exceeds men’s capacity.”183 
Professor West advances what she calls a “connection thesis”—that 
women’s moral voice and ethic of care happen because women learn to 
be responsible for those who are physically attached and then physically 
and emotionally dependent on them.184 Of course, Professor West’s 
explanation of why women are more relationship-oriented than men leads 
to many of the criticisms of cultural feminism, which this Article turns to 
next.  
C.  Addressing the Critics of Relational Feminism 
The criticisms of relational/cultural feminism are aplenty. The three 
most prominent criticisms of it are that: (1) if women do have an “ethic 
of care,” as Gilligan argues, it is socially constructed, not biologically 
based;185 (2) it is essentialist to claim that all women have an ethic of care 
or speak in a “different voice”; and (3) this “ethic of care” attribute is 
problematic if it becomes normative rather than descriptive, i.e., 
suggesting that women should be focused on relationships rather than 
simply recognizing that they are.186  
1.  Nature versus Nurture187 
Professor Mary Joe Frug explains that the level of criticism of 
Gilligan’s work is partially based on whether the critic reads Gilligan as 
asserting that there are inherent, biological differences between men and 
women or that these differences are socially constructed.188 Critics 
generally focus on how Gilligan’s work can be read as referring to all 
women and then those critics allege that Gilligan is arguing that these 
 
 182. West, supra note 153, at 13.  
 183. Id. at 16.  
 184. Id. at 14, 21.  
 185. To be clear, there is plenty of debate about whether Gilligan was suggesting that cultural 
feminism was socially constructed or biological. See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 152, at 1339 
(discussing this nature versus nurture debate of other scholars, comparing Gilligan to Professor 
West; Professor Gruber believes Gilligan makes no normative judgment about the cause of 
women’s different voice, but Professor West seems to link it with biology).  
 186. Professor Gruber describes this problem as the moral superiority of women. See id. at 
1341–42.  
 187. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 181, at 6–7 (discussing the nature versus nurture 
debate with respect to the “ethic of care”).  
 188. See Mary Joe Frug, Progressive Feminist Legal Scholarship: Can We Claim “A 
Different Voice”?, 15 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 51–53 (1992). 
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differences are biological.189 Not all scholars agree. Professor Frug 
argues that a better reading of Gilligan’s work reveals that Gilligan is 
aware of differences between women.190 But because Gilligan’s work has 
sometimes been read as assuming that sex differences are biological, this 
“artificially valorizes domestic roles traditionally assumed by white 
middle-class women.”191 
Professor Catharine MacKinnon’s critique of cultural feminism can 
be placed in this category. Her argument is that this ethic of care is not 
authentic—that “[w]omen value care because men have valued us 
according to the care we give them . . . . Women think in relational terms 
because our existence is defined in relation to men.”192 Similarly, 
Professor Joan Williams questions whether women naturally have 
nurturing skills or whether they acquire them because they are forced 
to.193 Other scholars echo this criticism.194 
In response to this criticism, the Author personally does not think an 
ethic of care is biologically based—instead, the Author believes it is 
socially constructed (and that Gilligan does not believe that women’s 
“different voice” is biological).195 But just because it is socially 
constructed does not mean that it does not feel like a genuine, authentic 
identity for many women.196 When borrowing from other scholars’ 
theories, the Author tends to follow the motto: take what you like and 
leave the rest behind. To the extent that Gilligan, Professor West, or any 
other feminist scholars think that women’s “ethic of care,” “different 
 
 189. See id. at 55.  
 190. Id.  
 191. Id. at 63.  
 192. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 39 (1987); see also Alcoff, supra 
note 169, at 405–06 (stating that an assumption that we can know how women truly are is 
“foolhardy given that every source of knowledge about women has been contaminated with 
misogyny and sexism”).  
 193. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 188 (2000); see also Fernanda G. Nicola, 
Intimate Liability: Emotional Harm, Family Law, and Stereotypes Narratives in Interspousal 
Torts, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 445, 464 n.135 (2013) (“‘Cultural feminism’ . . .  refers 
to the view that ‘women have a distinct consciousness and/or culture. . . . [that] [sic] derives from 
their biological situation . . . [or] emerges from their historical oppression by men. Some 
versions . . . . take [sic] both “essentialist” forms (women are naturally maternal) and “social 
constructionist” ones (men made women do all of the mothering).’” (alterations in original) 
(quoting JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 58–
59 (2006))).  
 194. See, e.g., Alcoff, supra note 169, at 411 (stating that it is a problem that cultural 
feminists are not clear about whether this identity of women is innate or socially constructed).  
 195. See Frug, supra note 188, at 57 (stating that there is an ambiguity in the book as to 
whether Gilligan is talking about all women or not).  
 196. See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 152, at 1355 (stating that women’s choice to mother is 
authentic despite the fact that society constructs social structures in such a way that basically 
forces women to mother).  
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voice,” or focus on relationships is biologically based, the Author chooses 
to leave that behind. But that does not mean that the cultural feminist 
theory does not offer some valuable insights worth taking. Because even 
if it is socially constructed, many women see themselves in the work of 
Gilligan. Many women cannot stop themselves from caring about their 
relationships, even those that might not deserve their attention or care. 
The law should recognize how most women feel and behave, even if it is 
socially constructed.  
2.  Essentialism of Relational Feminism 
Note that the last sentence used the words “most women.” Some 
criticize Gilligan’s work (and those who followed her) for assuming that 
all women are socialized to have an ethic of care.197 For instance, 
Professor Williams argues that those who do not see themselves in 
Gilligan’s descriptions feel violated because they see relational feminism 
as marginalizing their definition of womanhood.198 Professor Gruber also 
recognizes that there are those who critique relational feminism because 
it does not describe them.199 Similarly, Professor Frug states that the 
problem with one view of Gilligan’s work is that it excludes the women 
who do not see themselves in Gilligan’s descriptions, such as women of 
color, non-middle class women, lesbian women, non-Western women, or 
older women.200 Professor West has also been criticized for assuming that 
all women have this ethic of care, which seems to ignore women’s 
autonomy.201 
The Author is sensitive to the essentialism argument but thinks society 
is making a mistake if it ignores the way most women feel and act even 
if not all women feel and act that way.202 As stated by one scholar: “[W]e 
can say at one and the same time that gender is not natural, biological, 
universal, ahistorical, or essential and yet still claim that gender is 
relevant because we are taking gender as a position from which to act 
 
 197. See Frug, supra note 188, at 48 (stating that the danger with Gilligan’s work is that it 
has the “effect of perpetuating gender as an essential, irreducible part of identity”); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, What’s Gender Got to Do with It?: The Politics and Morality of an Ethic of Care, 22 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 265, 270, 275–78 (1996) (stating that the ethic of care is criticized 
because it is assumed to be essentialist); see also Porter, supra note 151, at 20–21 (“What matters 
to me is not whether [an ethic of care] is biologically based or socially constructed but that we 
stop penalizing women for engaging in caregiving.”).   
 198. WILLIAMS, supra note 193, at 194.  
 199. See Gruber, supra note 152, at 1347.  
 200. Frug, supra note 188, at 64.  
 201. See McClain, supra note 166, at 481. 
 202. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 197, at 285 (stating that the ethic of care is empirically 
connected to gender).  
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politically.”203 Perhaps more simply, as discussed below, women who do 
not see themselves in the work of Gilligan—women who are not so 
concerned about their workplace relationships that they avoid or delay 
reporting harassment—are not at all penalized by this Article’s proposals. 
Women who do not have an “ethic of care” and are therefore willing to 
report harassment right away are already adequately protected by the 
law—in fact, they are the “reasonable” women so many courts insist 
upon.  
3.  Normative versus Descriptive 
A third critique of cultural feminism is that some see it as not just 
arguing that women do have a “different voice” or “ethic of care” but that 
they should.204 For instance, Professor Williams argues that people 
should link the ethic of care not with biology but with gender role 
allocations. She argues that feminists can embrace the value of 
domesticity even if they “seek to change the subordinated context in 
which family and caring work occurs.”205 Professor Williams further 
argues that this distinction matters to those who do not feel like they have 
an ethic of care and therefore feel like other feminists are telling them to 
behave more femininely.206 
Another scholar echoes this concern, stating that although it is good 
to celebrate what women do well, society should not promote the 
restrictive conditions that gave rise to those attributes—the forced 
parenting, the lack of autonomy.207 Society is “in danger of solidifying an 
important bulwark for sexist oppression: the belief in an innate 
‘womanhood’ to which we must all adhere lest we be deemed inferior or 
not ‘true’ women.”208 Professor Frug also argues that one problem with 
how some view Gilligan’s work (and cultural feminism more broadly) is 
that “[i]t sentimentalizes and romanticizes self-sacrifice . . . [without] 
acknowledg[ing] the costs and problems of this attitude.”209 
Related to this critique is the fear that describing women in this way—
as more nurturing and focused on relationships—perpetuates stereotypes 
 
 203. Alcoff, supra note 169, at 433.  
 204. See id. at 413 (stating that the problem with cultural feminism is that it can promote 
unrealistic expectations about “normal” human behavior that many cannot satisfy); Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 197, at 277 (stating that the problem with attributing the ethic of care to 
women is that it becomes normative—women will only be valued if they are nurturing, caring, 
and relationship-oriented).  
 205. Id.  
 206. Id. at 198.  
 207. Alcoff, supra note 169, at 414. 
 208. Id.  
 209. Frug, supra note 188, at 63.  
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that could be used against women.210 The fear is that cultural feminism 
appeals to conservatives and is then used to celebrate women’s role as 
both mother and nurturer and to reject reforms aimed at improving 
women’s work lives.211 Professor West addresses this critique by arguing 
that there are differences between patriarchy and cultural feminism: 
“[P]atriarchy devalues women” and “celebrates women’s different sphere 
in order to reinforce women’s powerlessness” while “[c]ultural feminism 
does not.”212 She also argues that society needs to show that “community, 
nurturance, responsibility, and the ethic of care are values at least as 
worthy of protection as autonomy, self-reliance, and individualism.”213  
Although focused on the mothering aspect of cultural feminism, one 
scholar’s response to this criticism is especially compelling:  
[E]ven though it is true that arguing for adequate childcare 
as one obvious way of meeting the needs of mothers does 
suppose an orthodox division of labour, in which 
responsibility for children is the province of women and not 
of men, nevertheless this division is what, by and large, 
actually obtains. Recognition of that in no way commits you 
to supposing that the care of children is fixed eternally as 
female.214  
It is unnecessary to “invoke a rhetoric of idealized motherhood to demand 
that women here and now need child care.”215 
Extrapolating that response to the argument here, the law can account 
for the fact that women often care more about relationships without 
creating a normative argument that women should care more about 
relationships. In other words, even if this Article’s reforms—helping to 
protect women who were afraid to come forward to complain about 
harassment because of the fear of hurting their workplace relationships—
were enacted, this would not harm women who do come forward right 
away to report because they are not relationship oriented. These women 
are still the ideal victims, according to most courts.216  
 
 210. See Gruber, supra note 152, at 1340; see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 197, at 276 
(stating that an ethic of care is often created through subordination).  
 211. See Gruber, supra note 152, at 1388; see also Alcoff, supra note 169, at 435 (stating 
that some feminist demands associated with cultural feminism can “reinforce the right-wing’s 
reification of gender differences unless and until we can formulate a political program that can 
articulate these demands in a way that challenges rather than utilizes sexist discourse”). 
 212. West, supra note 153, at 50.  
 213. Id. at 66.  
 214. DENISE RILEY, WAR IN THE NURSERY: THEORIES OF THE CHILD AND MOTHER 194 (1983). 
 215. Alcoff, supra note 169, at 427.  
 216. See Niloofar Nejat-Bina, Employers as Vigilant Chaperones Armed with Dating 
Waivers: The Intersection of Unwelcomeness and Employer Liability in Hostile Work 
Environment Sexual Harassment Law, 20 BERKELEY J EMP. & LAB. L. 325, 335 (1999). 
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III.  REFORM: RECOGNIZING RELATIONSHIP-BASED HARMS  
This Article’s reform proposal is twofold. First, victims who 
eventually report harassment should not have their harassment claims 
dismissed for failing to report earlier if they feared retaliation, even if the 
retaliation they feared was only relationship based. Second, the law 
should recognize relationship-based harms as adverse employment 
actions under the retaliation doctrine. 
A.  Excusing Delays in Reporting Harassment 
As discussed above, even when an employee has a valid harassment 
claim—she suffered unwelcome harassment because of her sex that was 
severe or pervasive—the employer might not be held liable. This can, and 
often does, happen if the court determines that the employee failed to 
timely report the harassment. As discussed above, the specific rules 
regarding employer liability vary depending on whether the harasser is a 
supervisor.217  
If the harasser is a supervisor,218 unless the supervisor takes a 
“tangible employment action” 219 against the victim, the employer has the 
opportunity to establish a two-part affirmative defense: “(a) that the 
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any 
sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”220 
Because the second prong requires the employer to prove that the plaintiff 
failed to take advantage of preventive opportunities,221 if the plaintiff 
delays reporting, the employer will likely be able to prove its affirmative 
defense.222 
 
 217. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998) (discussing the differences 
between supervisor harassment and coworker harassment). 
 218. The Supreme Court defined “supervisor” in Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. 
421 (2013), as someone who is “empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions 
against the victim.” Id. at 450. 
 219. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808. A tangible employment action is described as “discharge, 
demotion, or undesirable reassignment.” Id. 
 220. Id. at 807; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998).  
 221. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 778 (“[W]hile proof that an employee failed to fulfill the 
corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an 
unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration 
of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden under the second element of 
the defense.”).  
 222. See, e.g., Hébert, supra note 16, at 721–29 (discussing cases where victims failed to 
report right away and courts held that they were unreasonable, thereby allowing the employer to 
win on the affirmative defense); Lawton, supra note 8, at 253–59 (discussing cases where 
employees were afraid to report harassment because of retaliation, but the courts held that a delay 
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Similarly, if the harasser is a coworker, the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving that the employer was negligent, which requires the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that the employer knew or should have known about the 
harassment and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent and remedy it.223 
This test also requires the plaintiff to timely report harassment.224  
And yet plaintiffs often delay reporting, in large part because they fear 
retaliation. In some cases, they might not fear retaliation that results in 
tangible consequences, such as a loss of job (although that is certainly a 
realistic fear for many employees). Instead, they might fear retaliatory 
acts (such as being shunned, ignored, humiliated) or other relationship-
based harms.225 As discussed in Part II, many employees, especially 
women, fear relationship-based harms in the workplace. Because many 
“reasonable” women might delay reporting, this Article proposes that 
courts should not use a plaintiff’s delay in reporting harassment to 
dismiss the plaintiff’s harassment claim at the summary judgment stage. 
In other words, plaintiffs should be allowed to survive summary 
judgment in harassment cases even if they delayed reporting as long the 
delay was based on a fear of retaliation, and even if the only retaliation 
they feared was some type of relationship-based harm. 
This proposal is likely to face significant pushback. Employers will 
argue that if they take reasonable steps to both prevent harassment before 
it occurs and to remedy harassment once they learn of it, why should they 
be liable for harassment that was not timely reported to them? This is a 
fair criticism, to which there are two responses.  
First, if the plaintiffs in these cases are also acting “reasonably,” as 
Part II argued, then between the two “reasonable” actors, who should bear 
the burden of the loss? The employer should, in part because it is the less 
vulnerable party,226 but also, and more importantly, because it is in the 
best position to prevent both the harassment and the retaliation that many 
employees fear. This naturally leads to the second response to this 
criticism: in the wake of the #MeToo era, employers can and should do 
better at preventing harassment and retaliation from occuring.  
As discussed in the EEOC Task Force Report (which, interestingly, 
predated the #MeToo movement), preventing harassment is all about 
 
of six weeks from the first incident means that the plaintiffs unreasonably failed to avail 
themselves of their employer’s grievance mechanisms); supra Section I.B. 
 223. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799–800. 
 224. See id. at 806–08. 
 225. See, e.g., Brake, supra note 5, at 37–38 (noting that, when coworkers side with the 
harasser, the risk of shunning may very well chill reasonable employees from complaining about 
the harassment).  
 226. Cf. Estrich, supra note 27, at 838–39 (arguing that between the supervisor demanding 
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culture changes in the organization.227 Leadership (from the C-suite all 
the way down) and a commitment to a “diverse, inclusive, and respectful 
workplace in which harassment is simply not acceptable” is necessary.228 
Organizations must have systems in place that hold supervisors and 
managers accountable for identifying and calling out harassment when 
they see it; responding in a meaningful, proportional way; and insuring 
that the employee reporting harassment is not retaliated against.229 If 
supervisors fail to respond appropriately to a complaint of harassment or 
fail to protect employees from retaliation, that supervisor should be held 
accountable for those actions.230 Companies should evaluate supervisors 
and managers according to how well they prevent and respond to 
harassment.231 And companies should prepare for the number of 
harassment incidents to rise after developing a more robust culture that 
encourages reporting.232 Increased reporting is a sign that the culture 
changes are working and that employees feel safe to report the 
harassment.233 Eventually, the reporting rates should be expected to 
decline after the culture changes have permeated the entire 
organization.234 In sum, according to the EEOC, “organizational culture 
is one of the key drivers of [minimizing] harassment.”235 
How companies achieve this culture change is a tricky question. 
While some of it will come from decisions made in the C-suite, changing 
the way that supervisors treat harassment and retaliation will obviously 
 
 227. See U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at 31.  
 228. Id.  
 229. See id.  
 230. Id. at 35.  
 231. See id. at 35–36.  
 232. See id. at 36. 
 233. See id. (stating that “[p]ositive organizational change can be reflected in an initial 
increase of complaints”; this means that employees have faith in the system).  
 234. See id. at 36, 56 (discussing the experience of one company that experienced greater 
reporting rates in the first three years of initiating a training program but then saw their complaints 
decline by 70%, along with a decrease in the severity of the types of harassment complaints). 
 235. Id. at 54 (emphasis omitted).  
An organization’s culture is set by the values of an organization. To achieve 
a workplace without harassment, the values of the organization must put a 
premium on diversity and inclusion, must include a belief that all employees in 
a workplace deserve to be respected, regardless of their race, religion, national 
origin, sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation, or gender identity), age, 
disability, or genetic information, and must make clear that part of respect means 
not harassing an individual on any of those bases. In short, an organization’s 
commitment to a harassment-free workplace must not be based on a compliance 
mindset, and instead must be part of an overall diversity and inclusion strategy.  
Id. at 31 (emphasis omitted). 
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require those supervisors and managers to be appropriately trained. The 
Author is reluctant to suggest more training given the uncertainty of the 
success of training.236 But as noted by the EEOC Task Force Report, 
training can be effective if it is not just focused on a compliance mindset 
(i.e., checking off boxes to avoid liability) but is instead focused on 
changing the culture of the company to increase diversity237 and inclusion 
and to make sure supervisors understand how to handle complaints 
appropriately.238 Employers need to acknowledge and own “well-handled 
complaints, instead of burying the fact that there had been a complaint 
and that discipline had been taken.”239 
Another response to the critics of this proposal is that this Article is 
not suggesting that plaintiffs will necessarily win when they delay 
reporting—it is only proposing that they survive summary judgment so 
that they can have their day in court. Part of the problem with the 
summary judgment standard is that judges seem to be unable (or 
unwilling) to put themselves into the shoes of harassment victims. 
Perhaps this is not surprising; as stated by one scholar, society should not 
expect women to behave how judges think they would behave because 
judges are very rarely victims of harassment.240 Juries (especially gender-
diverse juries) are in a much better position to gauge whether a 
harassment victim has behaved reasonably.241  
Perhaps a final response to employers’ criticisms of this proposal is 
that, even if plaintiffs are more successful when their cases proceed to 
trial, this Article is not proposing a change to the standard of proof a 
 
 236. See id. at 45 (stating that there are deficiencies in empirical evidence that indicates that 
training alone is effective to minimize harassment); Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention, supra 
note 41, at 37 (stating that some studies indicate training can be negative in that it might cause 
male supervisors to forego mentoring women and because it made some employees angry about 
participating); id. at 44 (stating that people should not use training as a way of limiting damages 
unless they know that it works); Bisom-Rapp, Training Must Change, supra note 41, at 63–64 
(noting the uncertainty about the effectiveness of training). 
 237. Professor Jessica A. Clarke points out that many of the institutions that have fired men 
in leadership positions in the wake of the #MeToo movement have used it as an opportunity to 
consider and increase gender diversity. Clarke, supra note 3, at 13. “[O]f [the] 201 male leaders 
who lost their positions due to sexual harassment, almost half were replaced by women.” Id. 
 238. See U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at 31.  
 239. Id. at 35; see also McCann & Tomaskovic-Devey, supra note 5 (stating that harassment 
claims are “better addressed by managers treating harassment claims as managerial 
responsibilities, rather than outsourcing them as strictly legal problems. Past research suggests 
that the most effective [method] to ending . . . harassment . . . [is] getting managers to take 
ownership of the problem”).   
 240. Hébert, supra note 16, at 734–36.  
 241. Cf. id. at 736 (stating that most actual victims do not behave the way that research 
participants say they would behave). For a discussion about how real victims tend to behave 
differently than the way that the public thinks that they would, see sources cited supra note 148.  
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plaintiff must meet for the court to award her punitive damages. Right 
now, employers can avoid punitive damages if they “engage in good-faith 
efforts to comply with Title VII.”242 Courts have held that training (even 
compliance-focused training that may or may not be effective) can allow 
employers to avoid punitive damages.243 Of course, plaintiffs will critique 
this aspect of this Article’s proposal. But reform is often about 
compromise.244 And allowing plaintiffs to survive summary judgment in 
cases where they often would have had their claims dismissed at the 
summary judgment stage is a fairly big win for them. As most 
employment attorneys know, getting past summary judgment 
dramatically increases the settlement potential of claims.245 
B.  Relationship-Based Harms as Adverse Employment Actions246 
The second part of the proposed reform is for courts to recognize 
relationship-based harms as adverse employment actions under the 
retaliation doctrine.247 Right now, courts almost universally hold that 
when reporters of harassment or discrimination are shunned or ostracized 
in the workplace, they did not experience an adverse employment 
 
 242. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 546 (1999) (quoting Kolstad v. Am. 
Dental Ass’n, 139 F.3d 958, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting), vacated, 527 U.S. 526 
(1999)).  
 243. See Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention, supra note 41, at 11. 
 244. See, e.g., Nicole B. Porter, The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between At-Will 
Employment and Just Cause, 87 NEB. L. REV. 62, 108 (2008). 
 245. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Disabling ADA Retaliation Claims, 19 NEV. L.J. 823, 836 
(2019). 
 246. The Author needs to acknowledge another hurdle to the proposal and to retaliation 
claims more generally. In addition to the three elements discussed above, see supra Section I.C. 
(stating that plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) protected activity; (2) adverse employment action; 
and (3) causation), some courts will also make it difficult for a plaintiff to bring a retaliation claim 
if the retaliation was at the hands of a coworker rather than a supervisor, see supra Section I.B. 
As discussed in detail in her article, Professor Brake notes that there is currently a circuit split 
regarding whether and when employers should be held liable for retaliation by coworkers. See 
Brake, supra note 5, at 11–31 (discussing the circuit split). Thus, in some circuits, even if this 
Article’s proposal to classify relationship-based harms as adverse employment actions under the 
retaliation doctrine were successful, there would be an additional hurdle if the relationship-based 
harm (shunning, etc.) was coming from coworkers rather than supervisors. This is obviously a 
real impediment to the potential success of the proposal but because this Article also deals with 
relationship-based harms between employees and supervisors (and not just coworker retaliation), 
it leaves a more robust discussion of the issue identified by Professor Brake for another day.  
 247. As recognized by Professor Brake, the promise of the #MeToo movement “is more 
dependent on the law of retaliation than the scope of sexual harassment law.” Brake, supra note 
5, at 6. I made a similar argument in my prior work. See Porter, supra note 1, at 58 (having the 
title Ending Harassment by Starting with Retaliation and arguing that ending harassment must 
start with preventing retaliation).  
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action.248 The reasoning of these courts is that reasonable people would 
not be deterred from reporting if they knew that they would experience 
relationship-based harms in the workplace.249 And yet, most of the 
empirical evidence tells us that the opposite is true—that employees 
(sometimes men, but especially women) often do avoid reporting because 
of fear of ruining their workplace relationships and sometimes even 
because they care enough about their harasser that they do not want to get 
that person in trouble.250  
There have been many calls for strengthening the protection against 
retaliation more broadly.251 This proposal is specific in that it is only 
addressing the second element of the prima facie case, whether the 
plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action. Reforming this element 
could be accomplished in a couple of different ways. The standard for 
proving an adverse employment action could be broadened for all types 
of actions, such as disciplines, transfers to undesirable positions, etc.252 
Or it could simply be specified that relationship-based harms would count 
as adverse employment actions. This would mean that being shunned or 
ostracized in the workplace—having coworkers or your supervisor ignore 
you, slam doors in your face, noticeably talk behind your back, etc.—
would constitute adverse employment actions. To be clear, there are 
compelling arguments to be made in favor of reform efforts that would 
 
 248. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.  
 249. Brake, supra note 5, at 33 (noting that courts minimize the deterrent effect of actions 
such as shunning and ostracizing); Grossman, supra note 7, at 1046 (“[T]he implication of 
Burlington Northern and its progeny is that reasonable employees are ‘resilient, self-sufficient, 
and willing to risk the loss of congenial relationships at work in exchange for the assertion of civil 
rights.’” (quoting Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-
Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 907 (2008))). 
 250. See Brake, supra note 5, at 34; supra Section II.A.1. 
 251. See Porter, supra note 246, at 852–54 (arguing for changes to all three elements of the 
prima facie retaliation claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act); Porter, supra note 1, at 
56–57 (arguing for changes to all three elements of the prima facie retaliation claim in harassment 
cases); Schultz, supra note 7, at 38 (arguing that protection against retaliation for victims of 
harassment must be strengthened because “[h]arassment can be eliminated only if people who are 
harassed are safe in coming forward”); Sperino, supra note 87, at 2069 (arguing for a broader 
standard for determining adverse employment action); see also Brake, supra note 20, at 102–03 
(arguing for a new retaliation standard); Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89 IND. 
L.J. 115, 165–69 (2014) (recommending two fixes to the retaliation doctrine).  
 252. See Porter, supra note 1, at 55 (arguing that the narrow standard for adverse 
employment action “does not comport with reality”); Schultz, supra note 7, at 41 (stating that the 
adverse employment action should be broadly defined); Sperino, supra note 87, at 2069 (arguing 
for a standard where anything more than de minimis harm is protected).  
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more generally broaden the definition of adverse employment action,253 
but that reform is beyond the scope and purpose of this Article. 
Similar to the proposal regarding delays in reporting, this reform 
would allow the plaintiff to survive summary judgment on her retaliation 
claim if she suffered relationship-based harms. Just as judges have proven 
themselves incapable of understanding why women might avoid 
reporting harassment, they are perhaps even more incapable of imagining 
what would “dissuade a reasonable worker”254 from reporting harassment 
or discrimination. As I have previously argued elsewhere, “federal 
judges, who have lifetime job security, are less likely to feel threatened 
or deterred by actions that would deter a reasonable worker, who does not 
enjoy such job security.”255 
The major criticism to this proposal would likely take the form of the 
following question: how do employers control the actions of their 
employees, especially when those employees are not supervisors?256 In 
other words, although society might expect an employer to be liable for 
the retaliatory actions of its supervisors (such as terminations and 
demotions), can society expect employers to be able to stop their 
employees from shunning or ostracizing those who report harassment in 
the workplace?257 And perhaps even more fundamentally, how would the 
employers even know this was happening?258  
The answer is similar to the response above: it is all about changing 
the workplace culture. In this case, it is about celebrating a culture of 
reporting rather than punishing reporting.259  
 
 253. See Porter, supra note 246, at 852–54; Porter, supra note 1, at 54–55. As noted by one 
scholar, most employees consider a broad range of actions to be retaliatory, even things that 
merely cause discomfort. Walker, supra note 18, at 21. 
 254. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). 
 255. Porter, supra note 1, at 55. But see Brake, supra note 5, at 40–41 (discussing a recent 
case, Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., 895 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2018), where the court acknowledged 
the difficulty of speaking up about harassment).  
 256. For instance, this issue arose in Rennard v. Woodworker’s Supply, Inc., where the court 
noted that the plaintiff was shunned by her coworkers, but the court held that, although coworker 
retaliatory harassment can sometimes constitute an adverse employment action, it only will if 
management either orchestrated the harassment or knew about it and acquiesced in it, and there 
was no evidence of that occurring here. 101 F. App’x 296, 308 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 257. The importance of accomplishing this cannot be overstated. As Professor Brake has 
noted, coworkers’ reactions to reports of harassment are really important. Brake, supra note 5, at 
7. “[A] lack of coworker support can make employees more vulnerable to harassment . . . .” Id. at 
7–8. Moreover, “coworkers can be an equally powerful force in establishing cultures of silence 
and discrimination.” Id. at 8. If coworkers side with the harasser, they might exclude the victim 
from key informal networks that are important to job success. Id.   
 258. See id. at 18 (noting that the Tenth Circuit requires actual knowledge of the retaliation).  
 259. See Bingham & Scherer, supra note 14, at 245 (hypothesizing that power, gender, and 
perceived work climate are associated with employees’ responses to sexual harassment and their 
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However, as some scholars have noted, most employers do not 
actually want to encourage complaints.260 In fact, many employers often 
react to complaints with “aggressive attacks on those who complain,” 
which are “designed to isolate the charging party and to send a message 
to other workers that the cost of pursuing legal remedies to discrimination 
will be prohibitively high.”261 
And as another scholar has stated, “[c]reating a work environment in 
which employees . . . feel comfortable reporting suspected 
misconduct . . . is something that . . . few[] companies have managed to 
do [well].”262 This is not surprising because most people have 
internalized a message of not wanting to be a “snitch.”263 And even minor 
retaliation “can have a deleterious impact on reporting procedures.”264  
Thus, as other scholars have argued, managers should be trained to 
eliminate all forms of retaliation, even the more subtle retaliation, 
because it can have a detrimental impact on the willingness of employees 
to come forward about harassment or discrimination.265 “[Reporting] 
should be viewed as an attempt to improve the organization . . . not as a 
betrayal or something to be punished.”266 Companies should create a 
climate where victims do not fear reporting.267 Organizations need to 
support whistleblowers by minimizing retaliation against those who 
report.268  
As stated by one scholar: “When training management, it is also 
helpful to let them know that it is natural to feel angry, fearful or 
defensive toward an employee who accuses them of unlawful conduct. 
However, they should be reminded that showing anger or acting upon 
it . . . may give rise to a retaliation claim.”269 
 
satisfaction with the outcome of sexual harassment situations). One scholar has suggested that 
employers implement a multitiered reporting system that would allow employees to report 
confidentially or anonymously. Tuerkheimer, supra note 2, at 1191–92. She suggests that such a 
system would signal to employees that the employer is interested in receiving complaints and will 
act upon them (even the anonymous ones) whenever possible. Id. at 1205.  
 260. Grossman, supra note 9, at 14.  
 261. McCann & Tomaskovic-Devey, supra note 5.  
 262. Walker, supra note 18, at 19. In fact, because most employers do not like complaints of 
discrimination or harassment, retaliation or the threat of retaliation might be viewed by employers 
as an important means of discouraging complaints. See Bodensteiner, supra note 7, at 39.  
 263. Walker, supra note 18, at 19.  
 264. Id. at 23.  
 265. See id.  
 266. Bergman et al., supra note 19, at 230 (quoting Robert J. Paul & James B. Townsend, 
Don’t Kill the Messenger! Whistle-Blowing in America—A Review with Recommendations, 9 
EMP. RESPS. & RTS. J. 149, 157 (1996)). 
 267. See id. at 241. 
 268. See id. at 232. 
 269. Walker, supra note 18, at 23 (quoting Greg J. Richardson, Whistleblowing and Other 
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How employers address harassment can also affect the likelihood of 
retaliation.270 To punish harassers in a way that avoids them striking back, 
employers should “discipline” but not “demean” because “[h]uman 
nature suggests that one who feels demeaned, embarrassed, or unfairly 
treated is more likely to contest the adverse action than is one who feels 
respected.”271 The EEOC also suggests making sure penalties for 
harassment are proportional to the offense; “zero tolerance” policies may 
contribute to underreporting of harassment in part because employees 
may not want to get an employee fired for what might be a relatively 
minor infraction.272 
Furthermore, the culture change discussed earlier must include 
protection against retaliation. As recommended in the EEOC Task Force 
Report, employers need to give “[c]lear assurance that employees who 
make complaints” (and those who support other employees who have 
made complaints) “will be protected against retaliation.”273 If this is not 
happening, and employees are experiencing retaliation when they report, 
their coworkers will think twice before reporting.274 Therefore, the 
company’s established reporting system must provide a “supportive 
environment where employees feel safe to express their views and do not 
experience retribution.”275 Once an employee reports, there should be a 
procedure in place that not only avoids management retaliating in a direct 
way (e.g., termination, failure to promote, etc.) but also identifies other, 
more subtle types of retaliation.276 Not allowing employers to win 
summary judgment in retaliation cases will hopefully provide them the 
incentive to change their workplace cultures to encourage reporting, so 
that employees feel safe in coming forward.  
CONCLUSION 
The #MeToo movement has made a great deal of progress bringing 
attention to the problems of harassment in the workplace.277 But 
compared to the Hollywood victims that began the current version of this 
movement in late 2017, most workers do not feel nearly as comfortable 
reporting harassment. This is because the average worker fears the 
workplace consequences that can come from complaining about the 
 
Retaliation Claims, 762 PLI/LIT 869, 916 (2007)). 
 270. See, e.g., Bergman et al., supra note 19, at 232. 
 271. Bodensteiner, supra note 7, at 43.  
 272. U.S. EEOC, supra note 8, at 40.  
 273. Id. at 38. 
 274. Id. at 40.  
 275. Id. at 42.  
 276. See id. at 67.  
 277. See Porter, supra note 1, at 49. But cf. Brake, supra note 5, at 53–58 (stating that it is 
uncertain whether the #MeToo movement will actually help or hurt the state of the law).  
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actions of another employee, whether that other employee is a coworker 
or a supervisor. Often that fear is not about being fired (although it 
certainly sometimes is) but is instead about the more subtle types of 
retaliation, such as being ignored, shunned, or humiliated, that can make 
being at work uncomfortable or even unbearable. This Article has 
established that women often care about harming their workplace 
relationships. Thus, this Article has argued in favor of reforms that would 
provide more protection to those employees who fear or experience 
relationship-based harms in the workplace, similar to the fears Nina had 
in the story that began this Article. The Author is certainly not naïve 
enough to believe that this reform proposal is feasible in today’s political 
climate and also does not believe it would be an immediate panacea to 
the very large problem of harassment in the workplace. But as stated by 
Professor Vicki Schultz, although law alone cannot create change, 
“change rarely occurs without the law.”278 
 
 278. Schultz, supra note 7, at 17. 
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